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TRENDLINES:  
COURT DECISIONS, PROPOSED 
LEGISLATION, AND THEIR LIKELY IMPACT 
ON BINATIONAL SAME-SEX FAMILIES 
Jay Strozdas* 
Family is a cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy. The United States 
grants green cards to every immigrant who is validly married to a U.S. 
citizen—unless the marriage is to someone of the same sex. The Defense 
of Marriage Act (DOMA) denies federal recognition of so-called same-
sex marriages. Recent social, political, judicial, and legislative trends 
suggest the eventual abrogation of DOMA. Even so, sponsorship for 
same-sex couples is not automatic and will ultimately depend on how 
DOMA’s demise is achieved. This Article illuminates a clear path for 
same-sex binational couples to receive equal immigration benefits in a 
post-DOMA world. However, if DOMA remains law, same-sex 
binational couples must turn toward comprehensive immigration 
reform. The Uniting American Families Act is a proposed piece of 
legislation that provides a sponsorship route that is unaffected by 
DOMA, but its requirements may prove difficult for same-sex binational 
families to satisfy. Thus, for the more than 36,000 same-sex binational 
couples who face decisions like separation or exile, an end of DOMA is 
the preferred—but not exclusive—solution for granting sponsorship 
rights to all families. 
 
 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Loyola Law School Los Angeles; B.A., Saint Louis 
University. I would like to extend immense gratitude to Kathleen Kim, Professor of Law at 
Loyola Law School Los Angeles, and Andrew Lichtenstein for guiding this whole issue. A very 
special thanks to Andrew Kazakes, whose diligent editing and thoughtful insights made this 
Article possible. I also thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. This 
Article is dedicated to the thousands of couples who are currently separated because of 
discriminatory laws.  
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We are separated, and without each other. . . . We just want 
to be together, that’s all. No harm in that.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Family is a cornerstone of U.S. immigration policy. In 2009, 
more than two-thirds of all green cards were obtained through 
family-based immigration.2 However, many families—those of gays 
and lesbians3—are excluded from that count. Gays and lesbians are 
ineligible to sponsor their foreign spouses or partners for family-
based immigration, even if they are legally married.4 This leaves 
approximately thirty-six thousand same-sex binational couples living 
in the United States5 in a state of immigration limbo. 
At first, many same-sex couples are able to stay together 
through nonimmigrant visas for tourists or students. But when the 
nonimmigrant visas expire, the options remaining are bleak: violate 
 
 1. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & IMMIGRATION EQUAL., FAMILY, UNVALUED: 
DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE FATE OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S. 
LAW 9 (2006) [hereinafter FAMILY UNVALUED] (quoting E-mail from Sandra (last name withheld 
at her request) to Immigration Equal. (Oct. 29, 2005)), available at http://www.hrc.org/ 
documents/FamilyUnvalued.pdf. 
 2. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2009 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 
18 tbl.6 (2009) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION YEARBOOK], available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/yearbook/2009/ois_yb_2009.pdf (reporting that 747,413 persons 
obtained legal permanent residence as immediate relatives or through family-sponsored 
preference categories out of the 1,130,818 total obtained in 2009). The number of family 
members receiving green cards may be higher than statistics indicate because spouses and 
children often immigrate as “derivatives” through a primary alien’s employment-based visa. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 201(f)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(4) (2006). Derivative 
family members are counted against the employment-based immigration quota. See id.; infra Part 
II.A. 
 3. This Article uses the term “gay and lesbian” to refer to people who identify as gay, 
lesbian, bisexual, transgender, or queer. The term is used for simplicity and does not imply that 
other identities are not similarly discriminated against. 
 4. This is because the Defense of Marriage Act—which prevents federal recognition of 
marriages between same-sex couples, whether the marriage is performed in the United States or 
abroad—controls the INA. See Matthew S. Pinix, The Unconstitutionality of DOMA + INA: How 
Immigration Law Provides a Forum for Attacking DOMA, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 
455, 458–60 (2008) (discussing DOMA’s effect on immigration law and the INA). 
 5. GARY J. GATES, BI-NATIONAL SAME-SEX UNMARRIED PARTNERS IN CENSUS 2000: A 
DEMOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT 1 (2005), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/Williamsinstitute/ 
publications/Binational_Report.pdf (reporting 35,820 same-sex binational couples based on the 
2000 Census). Many believe that the 2000 census undercounted same-sex binational couples by 
10 to 50 percent. See Teresa Watanabe, Line in Sand for Same-Sex Couples: Unlike a 
Heterosexual Spouse, a Gay U.S. Citizen Cannot Sponsor His or Her Noncitizen Partner for a 
Green Card, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 2007, at B1. 
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the law, separate, or live in exile.6 John Beddingfield and Erwin de 
Leon are one family facing this decision.7 After twelve years 
together, they were recently legally married in Washington, D.C.8 
However, when de Leon’s student visa expires, he will be forced to 
become one of the millions of unauthorized immigrants9 in the 
United States.10 Another option is exile. J.W. Lown, once the mayor 
of a town in West Texas, was forced to move to Mexico to remain 
together with a Mexican citizen with whom he fell in love, thus 
abandoning a home, a ranch, and a promising political career.11 As he 
put it, “It wasn’t a decision that any U.S. citizen should have to 
make.”12 
Many of these decisions affect not just the citizen and his or her 
partner, but children as well. Nearly half of the binational same-sex 
couples in the United States have children.13 Sandra from North 
Carolina was raising children with her Hungarian partner but now 
lives alone in the United States after her partner and children were 
forced to leave.14 Other children may remain in the United States 
while one of their parents is forced to leave. Shirley Tan, an asylum 
seeker, is raising two twelve-year-old boys with her lesbian partner 
of twenty years, Jay Mercado.15 While Mercado became nationalized, 
 
 6. Employment-based visas are a possibility but are difficult to obtain as there are quotas 
and most people who gain lawful permanent resident (LPR) status through employment visas are 
already working in the United States at the time of their application. INA § 201(d), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1151(d); Daniel Walfish, Note, Student Visas and the Illogic of the Intent Requirement, 17 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 473, 474 n.7 (2003). 
 7. Shankar Vedantam, Gay Couples Seeking Immigration Rights, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 
2010, at A13. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Following leading immigration scholars, this Article employs the phrase “unauthorized” 
as a more neutral term than “illegal” or “undocumented.” This is not to say that the law is 
irrelevant, but it is the present state of the law itself that excludes people like de Leon. See 
Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the Law, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1723, 1725 n.2 (2010). 
 10. Vedantam, supra note 7. 
 11. Michelle Roberts, Gay Couples Forced to Flee U.S. over Immigration Law, HOUS. 
CHRON. (June 10, 2009, 4:12 PM), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/6469222.html. 
 12. Id. 
 13. GATES, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that approximately 46 percent of binational same-sex 
couples have children under age eighteen living with them in their home). 
 14. FAMILY UNVALUED, supra note 1, at 9. 
 15. Julia Preston, Bill Proposes Immigration Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 
2009, at A19. 
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Tan’s asylum application was denied.16 With no options for family 
sponsorship as a lesbian couple, Tan only remains in the United 
States temporarily.17 
Current trends in federal court cases and targeted legislation 
may offer a route to permanent unification for families like Tan’s.18 
Because marriage rights confer immigration rights in the United 
States, the current debate over so-called same-sex marriage19 will 
shape family-based immigration for same-sex couples. Without a 
change in marriage law, Congress could craft legislation—whether 
standing alone or as part of comprehensive immigration reform—to 
expand family unification to include same-sex couples. 
This Article explores three emerging developments that may 
lead to equal immigration benefits for same-sex binational couples: 
(1) federal court challenges to the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), the federal law that limits the definition of marriage to 
opposite-sex couples; (2) Perry v. Schwarzenegger,20 a federal court 
case challenging the constitutionality of Proposition 8, California’s 
ban on same-sex marriage; and (3) the Uniting American Families 
Act (UAFA), proposed legislation that would carve out a non-
marriage-based sponsorship exception for same-sex binational 
couples. Each of these developments presents a possible solution for 
families like Tan’s and de Leon’s to avoid separation, exile, or 
breaking the law. However, each potential solution also presents its 
own obstacles for same-sex binational couples. This Article will 
discuss and shed light on these obstacles and present resolutions to 
illuminate clearer paths to immigration equality—so all families can 
remain together. 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. Tan has avoided deportation only because Senator Dianne Feinstein introduced a private 
bill on Tan’s behalf. Id. Congress can pass a private bill creating an exception to public law for 
one individual or a specified group of individuals. For more information on private bills see 
Matthew Mantel, Private Bills and Private Laws, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 87 (2007). 
 18. For more stories of families facing separation, see STOP THE DEPORTATIONS: THE 
DOMA PROJECT, http://stopthedeportations.blogspot.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2011). 
 19. This Article avoids referring to the commonly used “same-sex marriage” phrase because 
that term invokes a feeling of a special right. Phrases such as “marriage between individuals of 
the same sex” more appropriately recognize that same-sex couples merely desire to be included in 
the same institution that opposite-sex couples are in. 
 20. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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Part II explains family unification under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA)21 and briefly details the historical and 
continuing legal inequality for gays and lesbians under the Act. 
Part III considers recent federal challenges to DOMA and evaluates 
the arguments in light of a later challenge to DOMA, as applied to 
immigration. Part IV focuses on the Perry v. Schwarzenegger 
litigation and its potential to yield nationwide marriage equality or at 
least to provide an additional route to attack DOMA. Part V explains 
the obstacles remaining even if DOMA is overturned and how same-
sex binational couples can overcome them. Part VI discusses the 
UAFA and outlines the thorny interpretation and implementation 
issues that this legislation presents. Part VII concludes. 
II.  IMMIGRATION INEQUALITY  
FOR SAME-SEX FAMILIES 
For most of the twentieth century, U.S. immigration law 
categorically denied entry to gays and lesbians.22 While foreign gays 
and lesbians are now allowed to enter the United States,23 they are 
inhibited from creating family relationships with citizens—as federal 
law continues to deny family-based immigration to same-sex 
couples. 
A.  Family-Based Immigration 
For an alien24 to enter the U.S. lawfully, he or she must obtain an 
appropriate visa. A nonimmigrant visa25 enables an alien to 
 
 21. The INA was created in 1952 by the McCarran-Walter Bill of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414. 
Prior to the INA, immigration law was not organized in one statutory location. Though the INA 
stands alone as a body of law, it is also contained in section 8 of the United States Code. 
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., http:// 
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel
=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextoid=f3829c7755cb9010VgnVCM
10000045f3d6a1RCRD (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). 
 22. See infra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
 23. Exclusionary provisions of the INA were repealed in 1990, allowing foreign gays and 
lesbians to travel to the United States as freely as other noncitizens could. See infra note 60 and 
accompanying text. 
 24. The term “alien” is chosen over more neutral terms such as “foreign national” to stay 
consistent with the statutory text. Further, the term “foreign national” includes legal permanent 
residents in the United States since legal permanent residents are eligible to sponsor other foreign 
nationals for family-based immigration; the term “alien” more clearly distinguishes the two 
groups. 
 25. There is no formal definition of the term “nonimmigrant” other than to generically 
describe an alien in a nonimmigrant class. 2 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN 
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temporarily stay in the United States as a tourist,26 student,27 or 
temporary worker.28 If an alien intends to stay permanently in the 
United States as an immigrant,29 he or she must become a lawful 
permanent resident (LPR) by obtaining a permanent residence card, 
commonly known as a green card.30 Typically, an alien obtains a 
green card through sponsorship by a U.S. citizen, an LPR, or an 
employer.31 The most common route to permanent-resident status is 
family-based immigration,32 which entails a U.S. citizen or LPR 
sponsoring a foreign family member. 
An alien obtains family-based permanent residence either as an 
“immediate relative” of a U.S. citizen or through one of the so-called 
family-sponsored preference categories. Immediate relatives include 
only spouses, minor children, and parents.33 The family-sponsored 
preference categories are as follows: (1) unmarried sons and 
daughters of citizens, (2) spouses and unmarried children of LPRs, 
(3) married sons and daughters of citizens, and (4) brothers and 
sisters of citizens.34 The major difference between the immediate 
relative classification and the family-sponsored preference categories 
is that no quotas apply to aliens classified as immediate relatives.35 
The wait period for an immediate relative is only the processing time 
 
YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 12.03[1][a], at 12–14 to –18 (Matthew 
Bender ed., rev. ed. 2010). 
 26. A tourist visa is a “B-1” temporary visitor for pleasure visa. INA § 101(a)(15)(B), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (2006). 
 27. A student visa is an “F-1” student visa. INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(i), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(15)(F)(i). 
 28. A temporary worker visa is a “B-2” temporary visitor for business visa. INA 
§ 101(a)(15)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B). 
 29. INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (“The term ‘immigrant’ means every alien 
except an alien who is within one of the following classes of nonimmigrant aliens . . . .”). 
 30. Green Card (Permanent Residence), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http:// 
www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=ae8
53ad15c673210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=ae853ad15c673210VgnVCM
100000082ca60aRCRD (last updated Mar. 29, 2011). 
 31. Visa Types for Immigrants, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/ 
types/types_1326.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010). Although there are other ways, such as the 
diversity lottery or asylum. Id. 
 32. See IMMIGRATION YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 18 tbl.6. 
 33. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). A parent is only considered an 
immediate relative if the sponsoring citizen is over age twenty-one. Id. 
 34. INA § 203(a)(1)–(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)–(4). 
 35. INA § 201(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (listing aliens who are not subject to direct numerical 
limitations). 
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for a visa,36 unlike the four-year minimum37 wait for the millions of 
prospective immigrants subject to preference category quotas.38 
Unsurprisingly, “immediate relatives” is the most highly favored 
immigration classification, receiving half of all green cards issued.39 
Spouses compose by far the largest group within the immediate 
relative classification and within family-based immigration 
generally.40 Yet the INA never defines the terms “spouse,” 
“husband,” or “wife.”41 Thus, the general rule is that “[t]he validity 
of a marriage ordinarily is judged by the law of the place where it is 
celebrated.”42 Married couples must follow the law in the jurisdiction 
where they were married and provide to immigration officials 
documentation proving their marriage.43 This is true whether the 
marriage was performed in a foreign country or within the United 
States.44 The INA even recognizes common-law marriages if they are 
valid where the couple lived together.45 
 
 36. Estimated wait times for processing depends on the embassy or consulate. For further 
information consult Visa Wait Times—for Interview Appointments and Processing, 
TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/wait/wait_4638.html (last visited Mar. 27, 
2011). 
 37. STUART ANDERSON, NAT’L FOUND. FOR AM. POLICY, FAMILY IMMIGRATION: THE 
LONG WAIT TO IMMIGRATE 1–2 (2010), available at http://carnegie.org/fileadmin/Media/ 
Publications/NFAP_Policy_Brief_Family_Immigration.pdf. 
 38. Reuniting Families Act, CONGRESSMAN MIKE HONDA, http://honda.house.gov/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=90&Itemid=76 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) 
(“There are currently 5.8 million people in the family immigration backlog waiting 
unconscionable periods of time to reunite with their family members.”). 
 39. IMMIGRATION YEARBOOK, supra note 2, at 18 tbl.6 (reporting that in 2009, immediate 
relatives received 535,554 out of the 1,130,818 total green cards issued). 
 40. Nearly 30 percent of all green cards obtained in 2009 were for spouses of U.S. citizens, 
who made up more than half of all “immediate relatives.” Id. Spouses of LPRs make up the 
largest portion of visa recipients under the family-sponsored preference categories. Id. 
 41. The closest that the INA comes is by specifying that the terms do not include so-called 
proxy marriages. INA § 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (2006) (“The term ‘spouse’, ‘wife’, 
or ‘husband’ do not include a spouse, wife, or husband by reason of any marriage ceremony 
where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in the presence of each other, 
unless the marriage shall have been consummated.”). 
 42. 3 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 25, § 36.02[2][a], at 36–5. 
 43. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 40.1, note N1.1(c) (2010) 
[hereinafter FAM: VISAS 40.1], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
86920.pdf. 
 44. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS 
AND POLICY § A, at 327 (6th ed. 2008). 
 45. Scott C. Titshaw, The Meaning of Marriage: Immigration Rules and Their Implications 
for Same-Sex Spouses in a World Without DOMA, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 537, 562 
(2010). Normally, the only narrow exceptions to the general rule of validity where performed are 
for proxy marriages and marriages deemed to conflict with public policy. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 
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Marriage triggers numerous benefits for aliens and their spouses. 
In addition to avoiding the quota system, marriage renders an alien 
eligible to enter the United States as a dependent of another foreign 
national who is a visa holder.46 Marriage can also be used as an 
exception to or a waiver of deportability and inadmissibility.47 The 
INA’s high regard for marriage even extends to those who are 
unmarried but intend to marry. A K-1 visa is available for the fiancé 
of a U.S. citizen,48 provided the couple met in the previous two years 
and is able to get married within ninety days of the fiancé’s 
immigration.49 None of those benefits are available to gays and 
lesbians. Immigration laws, in conjunction with DOMA, deny gays 
and lesbians the privilege of sponsoring their spouses for family-
based immigration and thus perpetuate a long history of 
discrimination. 
B.  Immigration Inequality: Past and Present 
Explicit discrimination against gays and lesbians for 
immigration purposes began with a ban against entry in the 
Immigration Act of 1917.50 Congress repealed and replaced the 1917 
Act with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, but the 
exclusion of gays and lesbians continued because the INA 
considered gays and lesbians “afflicted with psychopathic 
personality . . . or a mental defect.”51 If a prospective entrant was 
suspected to be gay or lesbian, he or she was referred to a Public 
Health Service (PHS) official to diagnose the personality or defect.52 
Upon diagnosis, the person was denied entry. In 1962, the Ninth 
Circuit rejected inclusion of homosexuality as a “psychopathic 
 
supra note 44, at 327. DOMA has become another large exception. See infra text accompanying 
notes 65–67. 
 46. See, e.g., INA § 101(a)(15)(F)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(ii) (providing 
nonimmigrant visa status for the spouses of student visa holders). 
 47. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (providing a waiver to 
inadmissibility due to unlawful presence in the United States to prevent “extreme hardship” to the 
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse of the foreign national). 
 48. INA § 101(a)(15)(K)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(i). 
 49. INA § 214(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d)(1). 
 50. Lena Ayoub & Shin-Ming Wong, Separated and Unequal, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
559, 563 (2006). 
 51. Id. (quoting INA, § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 182 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182 (2006))). 
 52. Id. at 564. 
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personality” on vagueness grounds.53 Almost immediately, Congress 
responded by amending the Act to exclude aliens afflicted with 
“‘sexual deviation’—i.e., homosexuals.”54 In 1967, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held there was clear congressional intent “to exclude from 
entry all homosexuals and other sex perverts.”55 
However, in 1979 the PHS informed the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS)56 that it would no longer diagnose gays 
and lesbians as having psychopathic personalities, following the 
American Psychiatric Association’s decision to remove 
homosexuality from its official list of disorders.57 The Department of 
Justice (DOJ) stated that it would still continue to exclude gays and 
lesbians, but that it would now rely solely on the alien’s voluntary 
admission that he or she was gay or lesbian.58 The federal courts split 
on the legality of the continued exclusion of gays and lesbians.59 
Congress resolved this conflict by eliminating the exclusionary 
language with the passage of the Immigration Act of 1990.60 
Although gays and lesbians are no longer categorically barred 
from entering the United States, they are still unable to sponsor 
spouses through family-based immigration. This issue first emerged 
in 1980, when Richard Adams and Anthony Sullivan received a 
marriage license in Colorado and Adams petitioned the INS to 
 
 53. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 652 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated on other grounds, 374 
U.S. 449 (1963). 
 54. Ayoub & Wong, supra note 50, at 565. 
 55. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967). 
 56. The INS is a former U.S. agency charged with handling legal and illegal immigration 
that is now part of several agencies in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
 57. Ayoub & Wong, supra note 50, at 565 (citing Shannon Minter, Sodomy and Public 
Morality Offenses Under U.S. Immigration Law: Penalizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 26 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 771, 779 (1993) and Memorandum from Julius Richmond, Assistant Sec’y 
for Health, U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, and Surgeon Gen. to William Foege and 
George Lythcott (Aug. 2, 1979)). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Compare Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470, 1480 (9th Cir. 1983) (ruling that homosexuals 
could not be excluded without certification from PHS), with In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1451 
(5th Cir. 1983) (denying petitioner naturalization because he was homosexual even though no 
PHS certification was obtained). 
 60. Ayoub & Wong, supra note 50, at 566. In theory, gay men remain vulnerable to 
deportation and exclusion based upon sodomy convictions, which fall under “crime[s] involving 
moral turpitude.” INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006). However, it is 
unlikely that deportation or exclusion based on such grounds would be sustained after the U.S. 
Supreme Court struck down antisodomy statutes as unconstitutional. See infra text accompanying 
note 76. 
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classify Sullivan as his spouse for immigration purposes.61 The INS 
denied the petition, finding that the couple “failed to establish that a 
bona fide marital relationship can exist between two faggots.”62 The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the INS denial in Adams v. Howerton, finding 
that Congress intended the term “spouse” to refer to members of 
opposite-sex couples and that it was within Congress’s plenary 
power to limit access to immigration benefits.63
 
While most of the reasoning that the Adams court employed is 
no longer tenable,64 Congress implicitly affirmed Adams when it 
passed DOMA on September 10, 1996.65 DOMA has two important 
parts: Section 3 defines the terms “marriage” and “spouse” for all 
federal purposes, and Section 2 affirms the states’ power to refuse to 
recognize marriages that were performed in other states.66 According 
to Section 3, “[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is husband 
or a wife.”67 Therefore, no same-sex marriages are recognized for 
federal purposes. 
Since the INA is a federal law, any reference that it makes to the 
term spouse incorporates the DOMA definition. Specifically, DOMA 
supplants the general INA rule for marriage recognition—a marriage 
valid where celebrated is valid everywhere.68 At the time of DOMA’s 
passage in 1996, it did not affect any same-sex binational couples 
 
 61. Adam Francoeur, The Enemy Within: Construction of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy 
and the Homoterrorist Threat, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 345, 354–55 (2007). Colorado did not 
generally allow marriage between individuals of the same sex at the time. Adams and Sullivan 
were able to persuade their local county clerk to issue a marriage license in order, hopefully, to 
keep Sullivan in the United States. Id. at 354. 
 62. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 139 (2d ed. 
1997) (quoting a letter from INS to Anthony Sullivan, Nov. 24, 1975). 
 63. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039–41 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 64. See infra text accompanying notes 243–246. 
 65. Francoeur, supra note 61, at 356. 
 66. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)) (“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian 
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other 
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that 
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right 
or claim arising from such relationship.”). 
 67. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006)). 
 68. Infra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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because no state or country performed same-sex marriages.69 But this 
is no longer the case.70 Even with a valid marriage, like the one 
between de Leon and Beddingfield, DOMA’s modification of the 
INA excludes same-sex couples from immigration benefits solely 
based on their sex without regard to the substance of their 
relationships. For example, if de Leon were to have a sex change 
operation, the INA would likely recognize the marriage.71 Gay and 
lesbian aliens may no longer be denied categorically from entering 
the United States, but they are still effectively barred from creating 
family relationships with citizens of the same sex. 
C.  Recent Developments in Gay and Lesbian Rights 
While DOMA is still law, recent court cases and social 
developments demonstrate a trend toward expanding rights for gays 
and lesbians. In 1996, the same year that DOMA passed, the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans72 overturned a Colorado 
constitutional amendment designed to prevent gays and lesbians 
from receiving any legal protection through local and state anti-
discrimination laws or even state courts. The Supreme Court found 
that the amendment was only explicable as “animus” toward 
homosexuals,73 which is not a legitimate government justification, 
even under deferential rational basis review.74 Thus, the Colorado 
amendment violated the equal protection rights that are guaranteed 
 
 69. In 2001, the Netherlands became the first nation to grant marriages for same-sex couples. 
See Same-Sex Marriage Around the World: From Criminal Prosecutions to Legal Unions, CBC 
NEWS, http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/05/26/f-same-sex-timeline.html (last updated Aug. 
2010) [hereinafter Marriage Around the World]. 
 70. See infra text accompanying note 77. 
 71. For a discussion of the INA’s recognition of a marriage involving a transsexual person, 
see infra note 234 and accompanying text. 
 72. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 73. Id. at 632. 
 74. Rational basis review is the minimum level of scrutiny. The standard is very deferential 
and the law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. The 
burden of proof is on the challenger. A less deferential basis of review is intermediate scrutiny, 
which is applied in gender discrimination claims. The law will be upheld under this standard if it 
is substantially related to an important government purpose. The burden of proof rests on the 
state. The most demanding level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny. This is applied in race 
discrimination claims. The government has the burden of proof, and the law will only be upheld if 
the government shows that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling purpose. This standard is 
usually fatal to the challenged law. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 719–20 (3d 
ed. 2009). 
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under the Fourteenth Amendment.75 Then in 2003, the Court in 
Lawrence v. Texas76 found that criminalizing private, consensual 
homosexual sodomy violated the substantive component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
Since DOMA passed, many states and countries have also 
shifted toward allowing gays and lesbians to marry. As this Article 
goes to press, there are seven jurisdictions in the United States and 
ten nations that perform marriages between individuals of the same 
sex.77 Eleven more U.S. states allow some form of civil union or 
domestic partnership.78 Public opinion has also shifted dramatically 
since the passage of DOMA. The percentage of Americans opposed 
to so-called same-sex marriage dropped from 68 percent in 199679 to 
roughly 48 percent in 2010.80 Some 2011 polls even show that a slim 
majority of Americans now support marriage for same-sex couples.81 
These numbers demonstrate that Americans increasingly accept—or 
at least support the equal treatment of—same-sex families. As 
President Obama stated, “it’s pretty clear where the trendlines are 
going.”82 Recognizing this, in February 2011, the President instructed 
 
 75. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
 76. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 77. The seven jurisdictions are Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, New Hampshire, New 
York, Vermont, and the District of Columbia. See Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and 
Domestic Partnerships, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
default.aspx?tabid=16430 (last updated July 14, 2011) [hereinafter Same Sex Marriage]. 
Maryland may become the seventh state and eighth jurisdiction. Legislation expanding marriage 
to same-sex couples passed the Maryland Senate but stalled in the House of Delegates. Annie 
Linskey and Julie Bykowicz, What Future for Same-Sex Marriage?, BALT. SUN, Mar. 13, 2011, 
at Local 1A. The ten nations are Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden. Marriage Around the World, supra note 69. 
 78. California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode 
Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. Same Sex Marriage, supra note 77. 
 79. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans’ Opposition to Gay Marriage Eases Slightly, GALLUP 
(May 24, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/128291/americans-opposition-gay-marriage-eases-
slightly.aspx. 
 80. Gay Marriage Gains More Acceptance, PEW RESEARCH CTR. PUBL’NS (Oct. 6, 2010), 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1755/poll-gay-marriage-gains-acceptance-gays-in-the-military.  
 81. Sandhya Somashekhar & Peyton Craighill, Poll: Slim Majority Backs Gay Marriage, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2011, at A2 (citing a Post-ABC poll that found that 53 percent of 
Americans say so-called gay marriage should be legal). For the first time, a Gallup poll found that 
the majority of Americans (53 percent) believe marriages between same-sex individuals should 
be legally recognized. Frank Newport, For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay 
Marriage, GALLUP (May 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147662/first-time-majority-
americans-favor-legal-gay-marriage.aspx. 
 82. Joe Sudbay, Transcript of Q and A with the President About DADT and Same-sex 
Marriage, AMERICABLOG (Oct. 27, 2010, 7:37 PM), http://www.americablog.com/2010/10/ 
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the Attorney General to stop defending DOMA in a few federal 
challenges.83 
However, Obama made it clear that DOMA will continue to be 
enforced because it is still law—until Congress or a court acts.84 
Accordingly, the INA will still not recognize marriages between 
same-sex couples. With DOMA remaining law, same-sex binational 
families, like de Leon’s or Tan’s, will soon have to choose between 
violating the law, separating, or living in exile. This painful choice 
could be avoided if DOMA is judicially overturned. Precedent set in 
current federal challenges to DOMA, the DOJ’s new stance on 
DOMA, and a federal challenge to a “same-sex marriage” ban may 
provide the path necessary for same-sex binational couples. 
Otherwise, these families will need to turn to immigration-specific 
legislation that sidesteps DOMA by granting rights to their families 
without invoking the word “marriage.” 
III.  ENDING DOMA AND  
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION 
The largest obstacle in the way of immigration equality for 
same-sex binational couples is DOMA.85 One solution is a legislative 
repeal of DOMA, though that is unlikely in the 112th Congress. The 
other path to equality is a judicial overturning of DOMA, which 
became more probable after the recent decisions in Gill v. Office of 
Personnel Management86 and Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (“Mass. v. HHS”),87 and the DOJ’s new 
stance on sexual-orientation classifications. This part analyzes both 
 
transcript-of-q-and-with-president.html. Vice President Biden echoed this outlook; on the heels of 
the Don’t-Ask-Don’t-Tell repeal, Biden remarked that a national consensus on gay marriage is 
“an inevitability.” Stephanie Samuel, DOMA Repeal Not Likely to Happen Soon Despite Biden’s 
Remarks, CHRISTIAN POST (Dec. 27, 2010, 3:39 PM), http://www.christianpost.com/article/ 
20101227/doma-repeal-not-likely-to-happen-soon-despite-bidens-remarks/. 
 83. Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Shift, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay 
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/us/ 
24marriage.html. 
 84. Id. 
 85. As explained above, binational same-sex couples are precluded from family-based 
sponsorship because for all federal purposes DOMA defines marriage as a union between only a 
man and a woman. See supra text accompanying note 67. 
 86. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 87. 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010). 
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holdings and how same-sex binational couples can exploit them to 
receive family-based immigration benefits. 
A.  Legislative Repeal of DOMA:  
Far-Reaching but Unlikely 
The possibility of a legislative repeal of DOMA may be slight, 
but it would provide the clearest path to immigration equality for 
same-sex couples. Recognizing the inequalities inherent in DOMA 
and the large change in public opinion since 1996,88 in 2009 the 
House introduced the Respect for Marriage Act—a legislative repeal 
of DOMA.89 Beyond its introduction, there was little movement on 
the bill.90 Even less movement is likely in the 112th Congress.91 On 
the other hand, Vice President Biden predicted—after the repeal of 
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT)—that the American people would 
encourage President Obama to act on the repeal of DOMA as he did 
with DADT.92 Then, on the heels of the DOJ’s announcement to no 
longer defend DOMA, Democrats in both houses of Congress 
introduced repeals of DOMA.93 In July 2011, the Senate held the first 
ever hearing on the repeal of DOMA and, as predicted by Biden, 
President Obama came out in support of the repeal.94 
 
 88. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 89. Representatives Jerrold Nadler, Tammy Baldwin, and Jared Polis introduced the Respect 
for Marriage Act on September 15, 2009. H.R. 3567, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 90. The bill was referred to subcommittee, but there was no hearing on the bill and no sister 
bill was introduced in the Senate. Bill Summary & Status: 111th Congress (2009–2010) 
H.R.3567, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.03567: (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2011). 
 91. Every cosponsor of the Respect for Marriage Act was a Democrat. Id. With the House 
shifting to Republican control in the 112th Congress, it is unlikely a Democrat-only sponsored 
bill will pass. Alan Silverleib, New Congress Set to Convene with ‘Tough Decisions’ on Tap, 
CNN POLITICS (Jan. 5, 2011 11:45 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2011/01/05/new-
congress-set-to-convene-with-tough-decisions-on-tap/. 
 92. Samuel, supra note 82. Many thought DADT would not be repealed, but it ultimately 
was on December 18, 2010. Ed O’Keefe, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Is Repealed by Senate; Bill 
Awaits Obama’s Signing, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2010, 12:10 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/18/AR2010121801729.html. 
With enough political pressure, DOMA may fall as well. 
 93. Ashby Jones, Dems in Congress Launch Effort to Kill DOMA, WSJ LAW BLOG 
(Mar. 16, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/03/16/dems-in-congress-launch-effort-
to-kill-doma/. 
 94. David Nakamura, Obama Backs Bill to Repeal Defense of Marriage Act, POSTPOLITICS 
(July 19, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-backs-bill-to-repeal-defense-of-
marriage-act/2011/07/19/gIQA03eQOI_story.html. 
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If Congress were to repeal DOMA, same-sex binational couples 
would need to look no further than the INA for immigration equality. 
Unlike all of the other options for achieving immigration equality, 
the repeal of DOMA would not require court action. A congressional 
repeal would show the federal government’s clear intent to recognize 
that all marriages are valid where they were performed. Same-sex 
binational couples would only need to get married before they could 
apply for spousal sponsorship under the INA. While conflicting state 
policies regarding marriages of same-sex couples may lead to 
additional complications, a legislative repeal of DOMA would leave 
little federal obstruction to same-sex binational couples’ paths to 
immigration equality.95 This assumes that the Respect for Marriage 
Act will pass the House and advance beyond a Senate hearing. The 
ultimate relief for same-sex binational couples, however, may come 
from the courts and not from Congress. 
B.  Federal Court Finds DOMA Unconstitutional 
Federal court challenges to DOMA have so far proven 
successful. Massachusetts, for example, is one of seven jurisdictions 
that allow same-sex couples to marry,96 but DOMA prevents federal 
recognition of those marriages. In response, two separate lawsuits 
were filed to challenge DOMA as it applied in Massachusetts. 
U.S. District Judge Joseph Tauro heard both challenges and, on 
July 8, 2010, found DOMA unconstitutional in both cases.97 The 
problem for same-sex binational couples is that neither of these cases 
directly implicates DOMA’s application to immigration. Same-sex 
couples must use any precedent created on the appeal of these two 
cases in a subsequent suit either to attack DOMA on its face or, as 
applied to immigration, to ultimately achieve equality in family-
based immigration. 
 
 95. The full analysis of immigration equality in a post-DOMA world is in Part V. 
 96. See supra note 77. 
 97. Abby Goodnough & John Schwartz, Judge Topples U.S. Rejection of Gay Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 8, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/09/us/ 
09marriage.html. 
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1.  Two Different Constitutional  
Theories Lead to Same Result 
The first case—Gill v. Office of Personnel Management98—was 
filed by the Gay and Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD).99 
GLAD argued that Section 3 of DOMA100 is unconstitutional because 
it denies each plaintiff spousal protection under specific federal 
programs.101 Judge Tauro agreed that DOMA, as it applied to the 
plaintiffs, was a violation of the equal protection principles embodied 
in the Fifth Amendment.102 He found all of the government’s 
proposed reasons103 to be without merit, and, thus, inferred that 
animus was the only basis for the law.104 Animus is not a legitimate 
government interest,105 so Judge Tauro found DOMA 
unconstitutional as it applied to the Gill plaintiffs.106 
In a companion case, brought by Massachusetts Attorney 
General Martha Coakley107—Mass. v. HHS—Judge Tauro again 
declared DOMA unconstitutional, though on different grounds. 
Coakley argued that the federal government—by passing and 
enforcing Section 3 of DOMA—overstepped its authority, thereby 
undermining Massachusetts’s efforts to recognize same-sex 
marriages.108 Both of Coakley’s constitutional arguments (based, 
respectively, on the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause) 
were essentially the same—that Congress has intruded into the 
 
 98. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 99. Press Release, GLAD, GLAD Files Lawsuit Challenging Denial of Critical Federal 
Benefits to Married Same-Sex Couples (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://www.glad.org/ 
current/pr-detail/glad-files-lawsuit-challenging-denial-of-critical-federal-benefits-to-marri/. 
 100. Section 3 defines marriage as only between one man and one woman. See supra note 67 
and accompanying text. 
 101. The specific federal programs at issue in Gill were federal income tax, Social Security, 
federal employees’ and retirees’ benefits, and the issuance of passports. Press Release, GLAD, 
supra note 99. 
 102. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 376–77. 
 103. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 104. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 396. 
 105. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
 106. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 397. 
 107. See Martin Finucane, Mass. Challenges Federal Defense of Marriage Act, BOS. GLOBE 
(July 8, 2009, 3:23 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2009/07/mass_to_ 
challen.html. 
 108. Id. 
  
Summer 2011] TRENDLINES 1357 
exclusive province of states to define marriage.109 Judge Tauro found 
that the federal government impermissibly conditioned the receipt of 
federal funds on the denial of marriage-based benefits to same-sex 
married couples.110 In doing so, DOMA induces Massachusetts to 
violate the equal protection rights of its citizens, which is an invalid 
use of Congress’ spending power.111 Further, Judge Tauro found that 
Massachusetts has the authority to recognize marriages between 
individuals of the same sex, so the federal government’s enforcement 
of DOMA encroaches on the province of the state, in violation of the 
Tenth Amendment.112 Therefore, he ruled DOMA unconstitutional 
because it exceeds the scope of Congress’ spending power and 
interferes with Massachusetts’s domestic-relations law. 
2.  Promising Precedent, but Narrow 
Gill and Mass. v. HHS are the first cases to successfully 
challenge DOMA.113 If upheld, they will create strong precedent for 
other challenges to DOMA, but the narrowness of their holdings may 
limit any immediate impact on same-sex binational couples. These 
cases will not create nationwide marriage equality, though that is 
unnecessary for same-sex binational couples to receive immigration 
benefits.114 The biggest obstacle for binational same-sex couples after 
 
 109. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 246 (D. 
Mass. 2010). 
 110. Id. at 248 (“By way of example, the Department of Veterans Affairs informed the 
Commonwealth in clear terms that the federal government is entitled to ‘recapture’ millions in 
federal grants if and when the Commonwealth opts to bury the same-sex spouse of a veteran in 
one of the state veterans cemeteries, a threat which, in essence, would penalize the 
Commonwealth for affording same-sex married couples the same benefits as similarly-situated 
heterosexual couples that meet the criteria for burial in [federal cemeteries].”). 
 111. Id. at 248–49. 
 112. Id. at 253. 
 113. See Marcia Coyle, Massachusetts Case May Be Key in Gay Marriage Fight, NAT’L L.J. 
(Aug. 31, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202433430922&slreturn= 
1&hbxlogin=1 (discussing other challenges to DOMA encountering problems in federal court). 
 114. Both Gill and Mass. v. HHS challenged only Section 3 of DOMA, the definitional 
provision, not Section 2, the cross-state nonrecognition provision. See supra notes 66–67 and 
accompanying text. In other words, neither case can directly spread marriage equality into states 
that choose not to recognize marriages for same-sex couples. GLAD, FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE DECISIONS IN GILL V. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS V. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 7 
(2010), available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gill-v-office-of-personnel-
management/DOMA-FAQ.pdf. It would take a fundamental rights analysis implicated in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger to spread marriage equality nationwide. See infra Part IV.C. Without nationwide 
marriage equality, same-sex binational couples will have some complications of marriage 
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Gill and Mass. v. HHS is that both cases were as-applied challenges 
to Massachusetts and the listed federal benefits. Neither case directly 
implicates immigration law. To end DOMA’s discrimination against 
same-sex binational couples in the context of the INA, another suit 
must be brought to challenge DOMA on its face or as it applies to 
immigration. 
After Gill and Mass. v. HHS, two new suits were filed 
challenging DOMA.115 While the new suits—Windsor v. United 
States116 and Pederson v. Office of Personnel Management117—
involve more federal rights than were addressed in Gill,118 there is yet 
to be a case listing immigration as one of the federal rights denied 
because of DOMA.119 If and when such a case is filed, any precedent 
set on appeal in Gill or Mass. v. HHS could shape the case’s 
arguments and ultimate outcome.120 
C.  Precedent on Appeal 
Any successful suits that same-sex binational couples file 
attacking DOMA on its face or challenging its application in the 
immigration context will require an understanding of the legal 
arguments at play in Gill or Mass. v. HHS. Any possible precedent 
created on the appeal of these two cases will be decided on either 
Tenth Amendment or equal protection grounds, or on both.121 While 
 
recognition under the INA. However, in a post-DOMA world, most valid marriages will be 
recognized regardless of state recognition. See infra Part V.B. 
 115. Lisa Keen, Two More DOMA Court Challenges Filed; Five Cases Now Pending, KEEN 
NEWS SERV. (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.keennewsservice.com/2010/11/09/two-more-doma-
court-challenges-filed-five-cases-now-pending/. 
 116. No. l:10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010). 
 117. No. 3:10-cv-1750 (D. Conn. Nov. 9, 2010). 
 118. See Keen, supra note 115; John Schwartz, Gay Couples to Sue over U.S. Marriage Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2010 at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/us/ 
09marriage.html?_r=1. 
 119. Some gay and lesbian immigration rights groups oppose challenging immigration laws in 
court because of the federal government’s plenary power over immigration, which may explain 
the hesitation on filing cases in the DOMA context at this point. See Same Sex Marriage, 
IMMIGR. EQUALITY, http://www.immigrationequality.org/template.php?pageid=154 (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2010). 
 120. The DOJ’s stance on sexual orientation classifications will also be important in shaping 
any future lawsuit. 
 121. Despite a delay, the DOJ ultimately appealed both of Judge Tauro’s rulings to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, although no specific grounds for appeal were given. Denis 
Lavoie, Feds Appeal Mass. Rulings Against US Marriage Law, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 12, 2010), 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/10/12/feds_appeal_mass_rulings_
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each has a different probability of success and will create different 
legal paths for same-sex binational couples, the likeliest and easiest 
argument for same-sex binational couples to build on would be 
overturning DOMA based on the animus reasoning in Romer.122 
1.  Federalism Argument Unlikely to Succeed 
The Tenth Amendment argument in Mass. v. HHS is not likely 
to be upheld on appeal,123 and it provides little traction for same-sex 
couples to attack DOMA. The federal government may indeed 
overstep its power by regulating marriage, but the same is not true in 
immigration. Constitutional grants and the precedent of the so-called 
plenary power clearly give the federal government the ability to 
control immigration.124 So affirming will do little to help same-sex 
binational couples who are directly challenging immigration laws. 
On the other hand, if the federalism argument were upheld on appeal, 
it would provide the basis for other states to attack DOMA. The 
outcome of a state-by-state approach is unknown, but such a steady 
weakening of DOMA could put pressure on Congress to repeal the 
Act. Since Judge Tauro’s federalism arguments are self-defeating,125 
this Article does not discuss this scenario any further. 
 
against_us_marriage_law. Without a full brief from the DOJ and no date set for appeal, the 
ultimate holding of Gill or Mass. v. HHS on appeal is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 122. One possibility on appeal in the First Circuit is reversal of both the equal protection and 
the federalism arguments (Tenth Amendment and exceeding Spending Clause power). This 
would leave DOMA intact and provide strong precedent for DOMA’s constitutionality, if it is 
attacked in other circuits. Since this option would not provide any path to immigration equality, it 
is not further discussed. Same-sex binational couples nonetheless should understand that there is a 
strong likelihood of a reversal. For discussion of a reversal see Jack M. Balkin, Be Careful What 
You Wish for Department: Federal District Court Strikes Down DOMA, BALKINIZATION (July 8, 
2010, 6:35 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/07/be-careful-what-you-wish-for-
department.html. 
 123. See, e.g., id. 
 124. For an explanation of the plenary power, see infra notes 211–215 and accompanying 
text. 
 125. Judge Tauro argued marriage is distinctly a state law domain, Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 250 (D. Mass. 2010), while also 
providing a list of federal programs that regulate marriage and deny same-sex married couples 
benefits. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 391 n.126 (D. Mass. 2010). In 
essence, Judge Tauro provided a history of the federal government’s involvement in family 
structure, but then said that the federal government cannot interfere with the state in these areas. 
Balkin, supra note 122. Also, the Tenth Amendment test that Judge Tauro applied is on shaky 
precedential grounds. He even acknowledged that there is Supreme Court precedent contrary to 
his test, but defended his test on First Circuit precedent after the Supreme Court decision in 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Mass. v. HHS, 698 
F. Supp. 2d at 252 n.154. However, further review of the First Circuit precedent shows that it 
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2.  Equal Protection Precedent  
Could Shape Future DOMA Challenges 
Same-sex binational couples will have an easier time 
challenging DOMA as it applies to immigration based on an equal 
protection argument. This first requires the First Circuit to agree with 
Judge Tauro’s reasoning in Gill that no purpose exists for DOMA 
besides prejudice.126 Such precedent could be used to bolster the 
arguments in newly filed DOMA challenges and in any future 
challenges to DOMA, but a Supreme Court decision would be 
necessary to end DOMA’s effects nationwide. Assuming that the 
Court grants certiorari and accepts the equal protection argument, it 
will most likely apply rational basis review. Judge Tauro avoided 
applying a strict scrutiny test since DOMA failed under rational 
basis,127 so it would be unnecessary for the Court to address strict 
scrutiny analysis. 
Gill rests on a Romer-like animus rationale; if the only rational 
basis for DOMA is animus, it cannot stand. The biggest issue for the 
Court to consider, then, is the government’s interests in passing 
DOMA. In defending DOMA, the DOJ chose to abandon the initial 
four congressional reasons for passing DOMA128 and instead 
proposed two new interests: preserving the status quo and taking an 
incremental response to social problems.129 The DOJ’s abandonment 
of DOMA’s original rationale suggests an implicit recognition of the 
lack of legitimate goals in light of Romer and Lawrence.130 While 
Judge Tauro’s analysis did not emphasize this point, the DOJ’s shift 
will have traction in later challenges to DOMA, especially in light of 
the DOJ’s new position on sexual-orientation classifications after 
 
relied on a Supreme Court case prior to Garcia. See United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 
1033 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 
287–88 (1981)). 
 126. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 397. 
 127. Id. at 387. 
 128. The House Report listed four standard arguments (similar to the Proposition 8 
proponents’ arguments) for not recognizing so-called same-sex marriage—procreation, morality, 
tradition, and preserving resources. H.R. REP. No. 104-664 at 12–18 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2920–22. 
 129. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 390. 
 130. See Jack M. Balkin, More on Gill v. OPM and the Equal Protection Argument Against 
DOMA, BALKINIZATION (July 9, 2010, 2:15 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/07/more-on-
gill-v-opm-and-equal-protection.html. 
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Gill.131 Even without the DOJ’s implication that past rationales are 
insufficient, there is some legislative history that indicates Congress 
passed DOMA because of animus toward gay and lesbians.132 
Assuming that the Court agrees with Judge Tauro that the 
original rationale and the new DOJ argument in support of DOMA 
are illegitimate,133 the only conceivable rationale left is animus. 
Animus is not a legitimate government interest, so DOMA cannot 
stand.134 Though the Gill litigation only technically applies to same-
sex couples applying for the listed federal benefits in Massachusetts 
(or, at most, the seven jurisdictions that allow the marriage of same-
sex couples), it would be difficult for DOMA to stand up to further 
challenges under the animus rationale. If DOMA has no legitimate 
purpose besides animus, it cannot withstand even rational basis 
review and should be struck down completely, not just in 
Massachusetts. Thus, same-sex binational couples could easily file 
another case attacking DOMA on its face using the precedent that is 
set in a Gill appeal.135 Though it is not certain that the Supreme Court 
would agree with Judge Tauro, such a ruling would certainly remove 
the largest obstacle to family unification for same-sex binational 
families—DOMA. 
D.  Perry and New DOJ Stance Bolster Gill Holding 
While Gill struck down DOMA under rational basis review, 
DOMA may potentially be subject to heightened scrutiny. On 
February 23, 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder informed House 
Speaker John Boehner that President Obama believes that DOMA 
Section 3 is unconstitutional.136 This development arose out of the 
 
 131. See infra discussion accompanying notes 136–140. 
 132. See infra notes 194–195 and accompanying text. 
 133. It must be assumed that the Supreme Court would accept Judge Tauro’s reasoning in 
order to discuss the possible effect of a ruling on same-sex binational couples. However, it is far 
from clear that such a ruling would happen in the current Court. See Balkin, supra note 130. 
 134. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 396 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993)) (“‘[W]hen 
the proffered rationales for a law are clearly and manifestly implausible, a reviewing court may 
infer that animus is the only explicable basis. [Because] animus alone cannot constitute a 
legitimate government interest,’ this court finds that DOMA lacks a rational basis to support it.”). 
 135. The animus argument would not be as strong for an as-applied-to-immigration challenge. 
The legislative history may show that there is general animus toward so-called same-sex 
marriage, but there is no evidence of specific animus toward binational couples. 
 136. Letter from Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. to Speaker John A. Boehner 1 (Feb. 23, 
2011) [hereinafter Eric Holder Letter], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/49404879/ 
Attorney-General-Holder-s-Letter-to-John-Boehner-on-DOMA-Appeal. 
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Windsor and Pederson cases that were filed after Gill.137 Those cases 
are proceeding in the Second Circuit, where there is no precedent on 
the level of scrutiny that a court should apply to classifications based 
on sexual orientation.138 Accordingly, the DOJ reviewed the criteria 
for judging whether heightened scrutiny applies and concluded that 
classifications based on sexual orientation should receive heightened 
scrutiny.139 While the DOJ will continue to defend DOMA if rational 
basis applies, the DOJ feels that, under heightened scrutiny, DOMA 
is unconstitutional as it applies to same-sex couples whose marriages 
are legally recognized under state law.140 
This development is welcome news for same-sex binational 
couples who can use the DOJ’s rationale to attack DOMA on its face 
or as it applies to immigration.141 The DOJ’s new stance has already 
proved helpful in stopping deportation proceedings of same-sex 
binational couples, and members of Congress have asked the Obama 
administration to halt the denial of green card applications of same-
sex foreign spouses.142 However, the DOJ is not the final arbiter on 
this; the federal courts still have to weigh in. With the Windsor and 
Pederson cases pending, the House of Representatives will step in to 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. at 2–3. 
 140. Id. at 5. 
 141. Savage & Stolberg, supra note 83 (“If the courts agree with the administration’s view of 
how to evaluate gay-rights claims of official discrimination, it could open the door to new legal 
challenges to many other government policies that treat gay people unequally—including federal 
laws that make it easier for noncitizen spouses to apply for legal residency . . . .”). 
 142. An immigration judge and government attorneys agreed to halt deportation orders for an 
Argentine woman who was legally married to a woman in Connecticut, citing the DOJ’s stance 
on DOMA as a likely reason. Kristen Hamill, Woman Escapes Deportation Until Status of Same-
Sex Marriage Made Clear, CNN (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/03/25/ 
new.york.marriage.law/index.html?section=cnn_latest. Also, the federal government, through 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, canceled a deportation order for a Venezuelan man in 
New Jersey who is legally married to a man, saying that this deportation “is not [a] . . . priority at 
this time.” While it is only one decision, immigration lawyers see this as a “significant shift” in 
policy for immigrants in same-sex marriages. Kirk Semple, U.S. Drops Deportation Proceedings 
Against Immigration in Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2011, at A16. Several 
members of Congress sent a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder and Secretary of Homeland 
Security Janet Napolitano requesting that they halt removals proceedings and hold same-sex 
marriage-based immigration petitions in abeyance. Chris Geidner, Senators Kerry, Leahy, 10 
Others Ask DOJ, DHS to Hold Same-Sex Bi-National Couples’ Immigration Petitions, POLIGLOT 
(Apr. 6, 2011 2:42 PM), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/04/senators-kerry-leahy-10-
others.html. Then in May 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder vacated a decision by the BIA in 
order to determine whether a person in a New Jersey civil union could be considered a spouse 
under immigration law. Matter of Dorman, 25 I&N Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011). 
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defend the law.143 Lawyers for the House filed briefs in the Windsor 
case seeking a deferential rational basis review, arguing that sexual 
orientation is not immutable and gays and lesbians are not politically 
powerless.144 
Without any precedent on point, it is uncertain how the 
arguments will fare in the Second Circuit. Any precedent set in 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger145 may predict the success of the 
heightened-scrutiny argument. The Perry litigation is over a state 
law, not DOMA, but it analyzes suspect classifications and 
heightened scrutiny as they apply in that state.146 With the new DOJ 
stance on sexual orientation classification, the heightened scrutiny 
rationale employed in Perry may have more traction.147 On the other 
hand, the Perry equal protection holding was grounded in the animus 
toward gay and lesbians—similar to the Gill holding. Thus, rational 
basis may indeed be the applicable standard in the Perry appeal. If 
Perry is decided on rational basis review, the House of 
Representatives’ argument to apply rational basis to DOMA would 
be bolstered. So same-sex binational couples may ultimately still 
need to rely on the Gill rationale. With many pending issues before 
the courts, it is unknown whether Perry or Gill will reach the 
Supreme Court first, if at all. Regardless, same-sex binational 
couples should understand that any precedent that the Supreme Court 
sets in Perry will illuminate the successful arguments in Gill, the 
new DOMA cases (Windsor and Pederson), and any future cases 
challenging DOMA on its face or as it applies to family-based 
immigration.148 
 
 143. Lisa Mascaro & David G. Savage, GOP Starts Work on Legal Defense of Marriage Law, 
L.A. TIMES, March 5, 2011, at A9. 
 144. Brian Moulton, House Lawyers Explain Why Discrimination Against Gays and Lesbians 
Is Okay, HRC BACK STORY (Aug. 3, 2011 12:53 PM), http://www.hrcbackstory.org/2011/08/ 
house-lawyers-explain-why-discrimination-against-gays-and-lesbians-is-okay/#.TjnVaHOxric. 
 145. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 146. See infra discussion Part IV.D. 
 147. The plaintiffs in Perry filed a motion with the Ninth Circuit to lift the stay on Feb. 23, 
2011, and cited the rationale in Eric Holder’s letter subjecting classifications based on sexual 
orientation to heightened scrutiny. Motion to Vacate Stay Pending Appeal of Plaintiffs-Appellees 
Kristin M. Perry et al. at 4, 7, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2011), 
2011 WL 638819, at *4, *7; Eric Holder Letter, supra note 136. 
 148. If the Supreme Court were to decide Gill using a Romer animus rationale, like Judge 
Tauro did, then it would be difficult for the Court to not affirm Perry given Judge Walker’s 
reliance on that rationale. Only if the cases were decided on different grounds—not equal 
protection—is the combined outcome clearer. If the Court were to find a fundamental right in 
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IV.  PERRY AND ITS  
IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION 
Independent of Gill and Mass. v. HHS, another federal case may 
be used to attack DOMA and its denial of family-based immigration 
to same-sex binational couples. One step toward immigration 
equality for same-sex binational couples would be nationwide 
marriage equality. A current federal court case, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, may produce this result. If the Supreme Court 
affirms the lower court’s decision declaring marriage to be a 
fundamental right for all adult couples (including gays and lesbians), 
it is unlikely that DOMA could stand.149 However, this is only one 
possible outcome of the Perry litigation. The Court could also decide 
the case on different rationales: equal protection grounds or a limited 
basis that applies only to California. These possible holdings in 
Perry could form the bases of subsequent legal challenges to 
DOMA, which are necessary for same-sex binational couples to 
ultimately achieve immigration equality. 
A.  Perry: History, Holding, and Appeal 
The Perry litigation arises out of the marriage equality battle in 
California. On May 15, 2008, the California Supreme Court held that 
the California Constitution guarantees same-sex couples marriage 
rights equal to those of opposite-sex couples.150 This decision was 
implicitly overturned when voters passed Proposition 8 (“Prop 8”) on 
November 5, 2008.151 Prop 8 added a new provision to the California 
Constitution, stating that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a 
woman is valid or recognized in California.”152 The amendment was 
 
Perry, then DOMA would be subject to strict scrutiny and almost certainly struck down. If the 
Court were to decide DOMA on the Mass. v. HHS Tenth Amendment grounds, then Perry would 
not be implicated. The ultimate interplay between Perry, Gill, and maybe even Mass. v. HHS will 
not be clear for some time, at least until the U.S. Courts of Appeals rule. 
 149. See infra Part IV.C. 
 150. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 857 (Cal. 2008). 
 151. Jessica Garrison, Cara Mia DiMassa & Richard C. Paddock, Election 2008: Gay 
Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A2. 
 152. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS: PROPOSITION 8, at 128 (2008), 
available at http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-
laws.pdf#prop8. 
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challenged under the California Constitution, but was ultimately 
upheld by the California Supreme Court.153 
The American Foundation for Equal Rights (AFER) filed a suit 
challenging Prop 8 under the U.S. Constitution.154 Chief U.S. District 
Judge Vaughn R. Walker fast-tracked the trial155 and issued his ruling 
on August 4, 2010, finding Prop 8 unconstitutional as a violation of 
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.156 He ruled that marriage is a fundamental right and that 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage was not rationally related 
to any legitimate state interest.157 Judge Walker therefore inferred 
that Prop 8 was based on either moral disapproval of homosexuality 
or animus toward gays and lesbians, which are both improper 
justifications for legislation.158 Thus, Prop 8 failed to satisfy rational 
basis review and was struck down.159 
The proponents of Prop 8 appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, which stayed Judge Walker’s order.160 The 
Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments on December 6, 2010, regarding 
the Prop 8 proponents’ standing to appeal and the merits of Judge 
Walker’s ruling. If the appellate court finds that the proponents of 
Prop 8 have no standing, Judge Walker’s opinion would stand, 
returning California to the list of U.S. jurisdictions that grant 
 
 153. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 153 (Cal. 2008). 
 154. Chuleenan Svetvilas, Challenging Prop. 8: The Hidden Story, CAL. LAWYER (Jan. 
2010), http://www.callawyer.com/story.cfm?eid=906575&evid=1. AFER’s case was argued by 
Ted Olson and David Boies, who famously opposed each other in Bush v. Gore. Id. This case was 
filed against the wishes of many gay and lesbian organizations that were worried about the risks 
of a negative decision. Andrew Harmon & Neal Broverman, Legal Experts Concerned by Fed 
Prop. 8 Case, ADVOCATE (May 27, 2009), http://www.advocate.com/Politics/Marriage_Equality/ 
Legal_Experts_Outraged_by_Federal_Prop__8_Case/. 
 155. Ashby Jones, Judge Puts Boies and Olson’s Prop. 8 Challenge on Fast Track to Trial, 
WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/07/01/judge-puts-boies-and-olsons-
prop-8-challenge-on-fast-track-to-trial/ 
 156. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 157. Id. at 994–96. Judge Walker analyzed the six purported interests set forth by the 
proponents of Prop 8 and found that none had merit or support. See id. at 998–1002. 
 158. Id. at 1002 (“[A]nimus towards gays and lesbians or simply a belief that a relationship 
between a man and a woman is inherently better than a relationship between two men or two 
women, this belief is not a proper basis on which to legislate.”). 
 159. Usually when a fundamental right is at stake, strict scrutiny applies. However, Judge 
Walker did not apply such scrutiny since even deferential rational basis could not be met. For 
explanation of the levels of scrutiny, see supra note 74. 
 160. Carolyn Tyler, 9th Circuit Grants Indefinite Stay in Prop 8 Case, ABC 7 (Aug. 17, 
2010), http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/local/san_francisco&id=7612521. 
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marriage rights to same-sex couples.161 This would have no effect on 
binational couples seeking equal immigration rights since federal law 
would be left unchanged. If, however, the Ninth Circuit rules on the 
merits,162 then the U.S. Supreme Court could hear the case, 
potentially leading to a change in federal law and relief for same-sex 
binational couples. 
B.  Reversal Would Be a Setback 
The Supreme Court could, of course, not uphold Perry.163 The 
Court could find that marriage is not a fundamental right that extends 
to gays and lesbians and that Prop 8 does not violate equal 
protection.164 Same-sex couples then would have no precedent on 
which to build a DOMA challenge. In fact, a reversal would likely 
set back the Gill litigation, since that decision relies on the animus 
rationale in Romer. If the Court does not agree with Judge Walker’s 
analysis of Romer as it applies to Prop 8, it is very unlikely that the 
Court would find animus in the passage of DOMA. With a defeat in 
Perry, efforts to achieve immigration equality through marriage 
litigation would stall. 
A Supreme Court affirmance of Perry would be necessary, but 
not sufficient, to remedy current family-based immigration 
inequality. However, whether affirmation could lead to federal 
marriage equality and a basis for challenging the inequality in 
family-based immigration depends on the scope of the holding. 
There are two different constitutional grounds on which reviewing 
 
 161. The Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the question of whether 
Prop 8 proponents have standing. The California Supreme Court will decide this question with a 
hearing to be held “as early as September [2011].” Maura Dolan, State Justices to Take Up 
Prop. 8: At Issue Is Whether the Measure’s Backers Have Legal Standing to Defend It in Court, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at AA1, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-
proposition8-20110217,0,2933016.story. 
 162. This Article does not speculate on how the Ninth Circuit would rule. As the Associated 
Press states, the Ninth Circuit is the “least predictable” appeals court. Paul Elias, Associated 
Press, Gay Marriage Appeal Faces Uncertain Future Before Nation’s Largest, Least Predictable 
Appeals Court: Analysis, CLEVELAND.COM (Aug. 5, 2010), http://www.cleveland.com/nation/ 
index.ssf/2010/08/gay_marriage_appeal_faces_unce.html. 
 163. The Court could also deny certiorari, leaving any Ninth Circuit precedent standing. 
 164. This Article does not analyze the reasoning of such a decision because it would not 
change the state of the law for same-sex binational couples, which is the focus of this Article. The 
reasoning could likely follow that of the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), 
which found no fundamental right to homosexual sodomy in the history and traditions of the 
United States. 
  
Summer 2011] TRENDLINES 1367 
courts could uphold Perry: due process or equal protection. Each 
ground presents a unique argument that same-sex couples can use in 
challenging DOMA and its effect on immigration law. 
C.  Fundamental Right to Marry  
Will Bring an End to DOMA 
A broad holding affirming Judge Walker’s ruling that Prop 8 
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
would not only bring about nationwide marriage equality but likely 
lead to family-based immigration for same-sex binational couples.165 
Affirming Judge Walker’s due process holding requires the 
Court to find that same-sex couples possess the fundamental right to 
marry. Once a fundamental right becomes constitutionally protected, 
strict scrutiny applies to all government action that impinges on that 
right. Under this exacting standard, it is unlikely that Prop 8 or any 
other state law denying marriage to same-sex couples could stand. 
This broad ruling would provide a strong precedent for same-sex 
binational couples who are challenging unequal immigration laws. 
Perry does not directly implicate DOMA, but it could be used to 
overturn the law in a new case that is brought under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.166 If marriage is a fundamental 
right that extends to gays and lesbians, DOMA impinges that right 
and a court would likely overturn it under strict scrutiny.167 
 
 165. Predicting the likelihood that the current Supreme Court will constitutionally enshrine 
marriage equality is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is also something that same-sex 
binational couples must consider in evaluating their options for obtaining immigration equality. 
For a discussion of the possibility of the Supreme Court upholding Judge Walker’s due process 
arguments, see Michael C. Dorf, A Federal Judge Strikes Down California’s Proposition 8: Will 
the Ruling Ultimately Advance or Retard Civil Rights for LGBT Americans, FINDLAW (Aug. 9, 
2010), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100809.html (“It is widely assumed that at least four 
of the current Justices—Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas, and Samuel Alito—would vote to reject a right to same-sex marriage.”). See also John 
Schwartz, In Same-Sex Ruling, an Eye on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/us/06assess.html (citing Professor Douglas NeJaime’s 
explanation that “even the four more liberal justices on the Court might shy away from a 
sweeping decision that could overturn same-sex marriage bans across the country”). 
 166. A Perry decision would not ipso facto mean that DOMA is overturned. Perry rests on 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies only to the states, and does not challenge any federal 
laws. Another case would be necessary to assert that DOMA impedes on the fundamental right to 
marry declared in Perry. DOMA would be challenged under Fifth Amendment due process, 
which applies to federal legislation. 
 167. This assumes that there is no compelling reason to exclude gays and lesbians from 
marriage that is narrowly tailored to that purpose. See supra note 74. 
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Without DOMA and with a fundamental right to marry, same-
sex binational couples could get married in all states, and the federal 
government would have no statutory reason for refusing to recognize 
such marriages. Since the INA does not define “spouse,” the “valid 
where performed” rule would apply to same-sex couples.168 Gay and 
lesbian U.S. citizens could then sponsor their spouses as immediate 
relatives. Thus, a holding that gays and lesbians have the 
fundamental right to marry would bring about immigration equality 
for same-sex binational couples. However, the Court could avoid the 
fundamental-right issue by deciding the case solely on equal 
protection grounds. 
D.  Many Equal Protection Arguments:  
Most Lead to End of DOMA 
The equal protection analysis gives the Court greater flexibility 
in determining the scope of its ruling, but the analysis also provides 
more avenues for same-sex couples to challenge DOMA. The 
Court’s could ground its equal protection ruling in several different 
rationales: finding sexual orientation to be a suspect classification, 
finding discrimination based on gender, or finding that the law fails 
to meet the rational basis test because it is motivated by animus or 
moral disapproval alone. All of these possible holdings would 
provide different legal arguments for same-sex binational couples 
who are challenging immigration equality. 
1.  Suspect Classification:  
Broad, but Unlikely to Be Considered 
Aside from the Court ruling that marriage is a fundamental right 
that same-sex couples enjoy, the next most sweeping decision for 
same-sex couples (including binational couples) would be for the 
Court to find that classifications that are based on sexual orientation 
are suspect. Then, all state action discriminating against gays and 
lesbians would be subject to some heightened level of scrutiny.169 
Same-sex binational couples could steer clear of the marriage 
 
 168. For a full analysis of the INA definition of spouse without DOMA, see infra Part V. 
 169. Since the Court has yet to consider whether gays and lesbians are a suspect class, it is 
unclear which level of scrutiny would apply. An analysis of the appropriate level of scrutiny may 
look similar to the DOJ’s rationale behind deciding that heightened scrutiny is applicable to 
sexual orientation classifications. See Eric Holder Letter, supra note 136. 
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argument and challenge the INA’s treatment of gay and lesbian 
couples directly under equal protection.170 The problem is that the 
INA is not facially discriminatory, as it neither defines “spouse” nor 
explicitly excludes gays and lesbians. Without facial discrimination, 
proof of a discriminatory purpose is necessary.171 It will be difficult 
to find such a purpose within the INA. On the other hand, DOMA is 
facially discriminatory, so no showing of a discriminatory purpose 
would be required. Thus, any litigation would need to focus on 
attacking DOMA on its face or as it applies to immigration. The 
ultimate result would depend on whether the Court, in a Perry ruling, 
chose to apply strict scrutiny—which is usually fatal to the 
challenged law—or some intermediate scrutiny akin to gender 
discrimination.172 While potentially yielding a promising result for 
same-sex binational families, an equal protection holding based on a 
suspect class is not likely in Perry, since Judge Walker did not 
explicitly rule on those grounds and the Supreme Court avoided a 
similar holding in Lawrence.173 
2.  Gender-Based Discrimination 
However, Judge Walker did conclude that discrimination based 
on sexual orientation is equivalent to discrimination based on 
gender.174 Perry was denied marriage to a woman because she was a 
woman. If Perry were a man, Prop 8 would not prohibit her 
 
 170. The INA would have to be challenged under the equal protection principles interpreted 
in the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Although the Fifth Amendment’s text has no 
equal protection language, the Court has interpreted an equal protection component to the 
amendment’s Due Process Clause. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
 171. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 74, at 793. 
 172. For a discussion of levels of scrutiny, see supra note 74. While the DOJ is not a party to 
Perry, its new stance on sexual orientation classifications could influence the discussion of 
suspect classifications here, which would then point the Court toward intermediate scrutiny. See 
Eric Holder Letter, supra note 136. 
 173. 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Since Lawrence, the Court has hinted at 
protecting sexual orientation. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion in Martinez stated, “Our 
decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in [the context of sexual 
orientation].” Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2990 (2010). Yet, the case was 
decided solely on First Amendment grounds, so that is only dicta, not law. 
 174. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 996 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The terms 
“sex” and “gender” are often used interchangeably in these cases, but scholarly debate questions 
whether the terms actually have different meanings. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CARLOS A. BALL 
& JANE S. SCHACTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 253–55 
(3d. ed. 2008). 
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marriage.175 On the other hand, Prop 8 is arguably gender neutral 
because it applies equally, prohibiting so-called same-sex marriage 
regardless of gender. However, the Supreme Court in race 
discrimination cases has expressly rejected the “equal application” 
argument.176 There is debate whether the Court would also reject this 
argument in the sexual orientation context.177 If the Supreme Court 
were to find that the equal application argument also fails in this 
context, then it would apply intermediate scrutiny and strike down 
Prop 8.178 
Then, same-sex binational couples could challenge DOMA 
under this heightened scrutiny precedent, since DOMA similarly 
prevents recognition of marriage based on the gender of the 
individuals involved.179 Or, same-sex binational couples could 
directly challenge immigration laws that deny family-based 
immigration solely because of the couple’s gender (male-male or 
female-female). The Court has previously applied heightened 
scrutiny in gender discrimination claims against immigration laws,180 
so this argument has solid support. The only problem for same-sex 
binational couples is getting the Court to hold that sexual orientation 
discrimination is akin to gender discrimination. The Court may avoid 
this ruling by deciding the case based on rational basis review.181 
 
 175. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 996. (“Here, for example, Perry is prohibited from marrying 
Stier, a woman, because Perry is a woman. If Perry were a man, Proposition 8 would not prohibit 
the marriage. Thus, Proposition 8 operates to restrict Perry’s choice of marital partner because of 
her sex.”). 
 176. See Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas NeJaime, Exposing Sex 
Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 461, 480–87 
(2007). 
 177. Id. Compare Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10–11 (N.Y. 2006) (“Women and men 
are treated alike—they are permitted to marry people of the opposite sex, but not people of their 
own sex. This is not the kind of sham equality that the Supreme Court confronted in Loving.”), 
with Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 29 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (“That the statutory scheme applies 
equally to both sexes does not alter the conclusion that the classification here is based on sex.”). 
 178. This assumes that there is no important government interest. See CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 74. 
 179. Section 3 defines marriage as between one man and one woman. See text accompanying 
supra note 67. 
 180. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (applying heightened scrutiny while ultimately 
upholding an immigration law because there are real differences between the sexes in relation to 
the birth process). 
 181. While he found gender discrimination, Judge Walker did not apply heightened scrutiny 
because he found that Prop 8 failed to satisfy even rational basis review. Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal. 2010). The Court could similarly avoid the 
gender argument by concentrating only on rational basis review. 
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3.  Rational Basis Can Be Used to  
Strike Down Proposition 8 and DOMA 
Judge Walker’s equal protection holding, like Judge Tauro’s 
holding in Gill, rests on rational basis review. Although rational basis 
is the most deferential standard of review, the Court used it to strike 
down laws discriminating against homosexuals in Romer and 
Lawrence. If the Court follows that precedent to strike down Prop 8, 
then same-sex binational couples could use the same reasoning to 
facially challenge DOMA as a violation of equal protection. 
Judge Walker indicated that moral disapproval of so-called 
same-sex marriage was the only reason for Prop 8.182 Per Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lawrence, “[M]oral disapproval, 
without any other asserted state interest,” has never been a rational 
basis for legislation.183 Affirming Perry based on this moral 
disapproval argument would provide strong precedent for same-sex 
binational couples to challenge DOMA as a violation of equal 
protection;184 DOMA’s legislative history demonstrates that many 
members of Congress supported DOMA because they believed 
homosexuality to be immoral.185 
The obstacle for same-sex binational couples is showing that 
there is no justification for DOMA besides morality. Since Prop 8 
supporters advance similar justifications to those that appear in the 
DOMA legislative history, the Court’s overturning of Prop 8 would 
strongly impact any DOMA challenge.186 The only obstacles are the 
 
 182. Id. at 998–1003. 
 183. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The majority 
in Lawrence was not explicit on whether morality is a sufficient basis for legislation, so it is 
beyond the scope of this Article to predict the Court’s treatment of this issue. 
 184. DOMA would have to be challenged under the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Prop 8 
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 185. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. H7444 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Tom 
Coburn) (calling homosexuality “immoral” and “depraved”); Aff. of Gary D. Buseck, Ex. D, H.R. 
Rep. No. 104-664 at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905 (reflecting Congress’s 
“moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports 
with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian) morality”). 
 186. Prop 8 supporters cite  
(1) reserving marriage as a union between a man and a woman and excluding any other 
relationship from marriage; (2) proceeding with caution when implementing social 
changes; (3) promoting opposite-sex parenting over same-sex parenting; (4) protecting 
the freedom of those who oppose marriage for same-sex couples; (5) treating same-sex 
couples differently from opposite-sex couples. 
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DOJ’s new justifications in defending DOMA,187 which Judge Tauro 
has already found to lack merit in Gill.188 In all, DOMA would not 
likely withstand an equal protection challenge if the Court were to 
find Prop 8 unconstitutional under Justice O’Connor’s morality-
alone rationale. 
The problem for same-sex binational couples is that the Court 
may want to avoid an explicit Perry holding based on O’Connor’s 
morality-alone rationale since many laws are, in fact, based on 
morality.189 The Court could root a more limited opinion in the 
animus rationale from Romer. Judge Walker’s finding of fact 
implicates the stigma that caused the passage of Prop 8.190 As in 
Romer, the Court could find that Prop 8 is “born of animosity” 
toward gays and lesbians.191 This is not a legitimate government 
interest,192 so Prop 8 would fail to survive even a rational basis 
review. 
Assuming that the Court affirms Perry based on Romer, same-
sex binational couples would again need to use that precedent to 
mount a challenge against DOMA.193 It is clear that Congress enacted 
DOMA knowing that it presented a potential constitutional issue 
under Romer.194 However, the existence of a constitutional issue does 
not necessarily mean that the bill was born of animosity. But there is 
 
Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 998. DOMA’s original justifications were procreation, morality, 
tradition, and preserving resources. See supra note 128. 
 187. See supra text accompanying note 129. 
 188. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 391–96 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 189. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 190. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 973–74. 
 191. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996). The Court could of course distinguish Prop 8 
from Romer. Prop 8 applies narrowly to marriage and does not restrict same-sex couples’ use of 
the political process, unlike the Colorado amendment that was “far reaching” and “forbid[] 
reinstatement” of the protections that it had taken away. Id. at 627. 
 192. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f the constitutional 
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental 
interest.”). 
 193. This challenge would again be under the equal protection principles interpreted in the 
Fifth Amendment. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 194. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S10,100-02 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy) (“Scholarly opinion is clear: [DOMA] is plainly unconstitutional.”); A Bill to Define 
and Protect the Institution of Marriage: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 48 (1996) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein, Professor, University of 
Chicago Law School) (“Insofar as [DOMA] draws the particular line that it does, it risks running 
afoul of Romer’s prohibition on laws based on ‘animus’ against homosexuals.”). 
  
Summer 2011] TRENDLINES 1373 
legislative history that points to Congress’ disapproval of 
homosexuals.195 This could be seen as moral disapproval rather than 
as animus. How the Court will construe the legislative history of 
DOMA is uncertain, but the animus rationale would be a viable 
argument if the Supreme Court extended Romer to Perry. Assuming 
that Congress enacted DOMA based on animus, there would be no 
rational basis for the Court to uphold the law.196 
Using similar logic, the Court could strike down Prop 8 as 
unconstitutional using Romer but craft a narrow decision only 
applicable to California. This would allow the Court to find Prop 8 
unconstitutional without committing itself to nationwide marriage 
equality or providing strong precedent to those who seek to attack 
DOMA.197 Under California’s domestic partnership law, same-sex 
couples receive essentially all of the same rights and responsibilities 
that married couples receive.198 Prop 8 did not infringe those rights, 
so the only distinction between domestic partnerships and marriage 
is the word “marriage”; Ninth Circuit Judge N. Rand Smith 
characterized this distinction as irrational.199 The Ninth Circuit also 
seemed to concentrate on the parallels between Prop 8 and the 
Colorado amendment that Romer struck down.200 Romer rebuked 
withdrawing legal rights that a group had been enjoying,201 which 
California did by first issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
and then denying that issuance.202 While some states do provide 
 
 195. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. H7501 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Henry 
Hyde) (“[M]ost people do not approve of homosexual conduct . . . and they express their 
disapprobation through [DOMA].”). For a detailed discussion of DOMA and Romer, see Andrew 
Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923 (2010). 
 196. This is very similar to the reasoning in Gill. See supra text accompanying note 102–06. 
 197. Though this holding may be the most probable, it is given short treatment in this Article 
since it has little effect on same-sex binational couples. 
 198. DENNIS CLIFFORD ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN & GAY COUPLES 33 (15th ed. 
2010). 
 199. Maura Dolan & Jessica Garrison, Judges Explore Narrow Options in Prop. 8 Appeal, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-1207-
prop8-20101207,0,3172063,full.story (“‘We’re left with a word—“marriage,”’ [Judge] Smith 
said. ‘What is the rational basis for that?’”). 
 200. Id. (“Reinhardt, the circuit’s most liberal judge, noted that Proposition 8 took away a 
right that gays and lesbians had been enjoying, just as the Colorado initiative repealed anti-
discrimination laws that had protected gays.”). 
 201. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996) (“The amendment withdraws from 
homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, 
and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies.”). 
 202. Dolan & Garrison, supra note 199, at A1. 
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domestic partnerships, no other state previously provided marriage 
rights to same-sex couples and then took them away.203 Further, 
Congress may have enacted DOMA for the promotion of morality, 
but the Act neither took away any previously existing right nor made 
a distinction only on the word “marriage.”204 Thus, the Supreme 
Court could strike down Prop 8, as it applies in California, without 
directly affecting any other states or DOMA by concentrating on the 
withdrawal of rights and the distinction based on one word—
marriage. 
The ultimate breadth or narrowness of any Supreme Court ruling 
is not clear, but same-sex couples must hope for a broad equal 
protection holding that applies beyond California. If the Court 
renders such a decision, same-sex couples will have strong precedent 
to attack DOMA. Without DOMA, marriages of same-sex couples 
would no longer be barred from federal recognition. Same-sex 
binational couples who are legally married would then likely receive 
INA recognition as “spouses,” yet they will have to overcome 
several hurdles along the way. 
V.  IMMIGRATION ISSUES  
POST-DOMA 
In order for same-sex binational couples to be equal under the 
INA,205 DOMA must either be repealed (by the passage of the 
Respect for Marriage Act) or be judicially overturned (based on Gill, 
Mass. v. HHS, or even Perry). Yet even if DOMA were no longer 
law, same-sex couples would be left to navigate the unclear 
patchwork of state marriage laws. Further, binational couples would 
be left without a clear definition of what constitutes marriage under 
the INA. While the current three-step approach to marriage 
recognition under the INA would still remain following a legislative 
repeal or judicial invalidation of DOMA, the federal government 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. When DOMA was passed, no state performed marriages between individuals of the same 
sex. See supra text accompanying note 69. Also, no federal law gives similar benefits to a 
marriage under a different name, like a domestic partnership. This, however, would be the case if 
the UAFA were passed. See infra Part VI. 
 205. The word “equal” is chosen to implicate the difference between this solution and the 
UAFA discussed in Part VI. The UAFA would provide a possibility of family-based immigration 
for same-sex couples, but Part VI.C–D discusses the different criteria used for same-sex couples 
(even spouses) versus opposite-sex couples. 
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could potentially use its plenary power over immigration to define 
marriage anew for immigration purposes. Below, this Article 
explores the possible resolutions to these open issues to provide a 
clear path to immigration equality for same-sex binational couples in 
a hypothetical post-DOMA world. 
A.  Defining Marriage for Immigration 
In the absence of DOMA, some definition of the term 
“marriage” will be required in order to permit gay and lesbian U.S. 
citizens and LPRs to sponsor their spouses. The federal government 
could create a definition or the current three-step approach could be 
interpreted to apply to marriages between individuals of the same 
sex. The latter is more likely. 
1.  Creating a New Definition for Marriage Is Unlikely 
In theory, Congress could choose to create a federal definition of 
marriage or spouse for immigration purposes only. This, however, 
seems improbable because defining marriage in only one area would 
be completely inconsistent with the current federal deference to state 
law206 and may even encroach on federalism principles.207 If Congress 
still felt that a definition was necessary, it could create one universal 
definition of marriage or spouse that would not violate any court 
ruling regarding DOMA’s constitutionality. This would likely 
require a malleable definition of spouse, such as the one in Black’s 
Law Dictionary: “[o]ne’s husband or wife by lawful marriage.”208 
Such a federal definition would be consistent with the current 
approach—leaving the states to define what a lawful marriage is. 
Adding a definition that reflects already current law would be 
superfluous, making Congress unlikely to do so. 
2.  Plenary Power Is Not an Obstacle 
On the other hand, even in a post-DOMA world, it is 
theoretically possible that Congress could still choose to create a 
 
 206. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 391 n.126 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 207. If the DOMA were overturned on Tenth Amendment grounds, Congress’s act of defining 
“spouse” in immigration may again exceed its power by entering the realm of family law. See 
discussion of Mass. v. HHS supra Part III.B. On the other hand, Congress may invoke its plenary 
power here. 
 208. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1533 (9th ed. 2009). 
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federal marriage definition for immigration that continues to exclude 
gays and lesbians from family-based immigration. It is doubtful that 
Congress would take such an approach if it were to repeal DOMA, 
but the approach is plausible if DOMA were judicially overturned.209 
Congress may want to strike back at the Court and thus could use its 
plenary power over immigration to define spouse210—for 
immigration purposes only—to exclude marriages of same-sex 
couples. While the courts are very deferential to Congress in 
immigration contexts, a U.S. citizen (one part of a same-sex 
binational couple) would have strong legal arguments to attack such 
a use of the plenary power in a post-DOMA world as a violation of 
equal protection. 
The Constitution provides Congress with the power “[t]o 
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization,”211 but it is silent as to 
admission and expulsion of aliens.212 Nonetheless, since 1889 the 
Supreme Court has recognized the so-called plenary power of 
Congress over immigration.213 According to the Court, the federal 
government enjoys an unfettered right to exclude, and that exercise 
of power merits extraordinary judicial deference.214 Justification for 
the power is found in the general grant of federal power over foreign 
relations and as “an incident of sovereignty.”215 The power applies to 
both substance and procedure216 and continues into the twentieth 
century, even in spite of some immigration laws’ discriminatory 
 
 209. Congress could pass a law that potentially violates a DOMA ruling. After all, the 
legislative history of DOMA shows an understanding of a potential conflict with Romer. See 
supra note 194. 
 210. This is different than arguing that there should be judicial deference to DOMA in the 
immigration context because, as the DOJ has said, “neither DOMA nor its legislative history 
suggest that DOMA was enacted as an exercise of Congress’s plenary power.” Chris Geidner, 
Defending DOMA, Fighting Back, METRO WEEKLY (Sept. 6, 2011 2:53 PM), http://metroweekly. 
com/news/?ak=6543. 
 211. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 212. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, at 192. 
 213. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 214. Id. at 603–04. 
 215. Id. at 609. For further discussion of the plenary power and its justifications, see Louis 
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its 
Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century 
of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 
545 (1990). 
 216. Motomura, supra note 215, at 552. 
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effects.217 Invoking this power, Congress could amend the INA to 
explicitly discriminate against same-sex binational couples. 
However, new developments in the law suggest a limiting of this 
plenary power—especially when a U.S. citizen is involved. 
Recent precedent demonstrates that the Court is deferring less to 
Congress in the immigration context.218 The Court specifically noted 
that the plenary power over immigration “is subject to important 
constitutional limitations”219 and cannot “offend some other 
constitutional restriction[s].”220 Under this rationale, the Fifth 
Amendment’s equal protection principles would limit Congress’ 
continued exclusion of same-sex binational couples, if any, in a post-
DOMA world.221 
In two recent equal protection decisions, the Court demonstrated 
its willingness to apply heightened scrutiny even to immigration 
laws.222 The Court, however, stated that it would only decide the 
equal protection challenge in Nguyen v. INS223 because Nguyen’s 
U.S. citizen father was a party to the suit. Unlike most plaintiffs 
challenging immigration laws, same-sex binational couples include 
 
 217. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 (1977) (allowing immigration laws to deny an 
unmarried father immigration preferences because such decisions were “solely for the 
responsibility of the Congress and wholly outside the power of [the Supreme] Court to control.” 
(quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))). 
 218. Whitney Chelgren, Developments Article, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why It Is 
Unconstitutional to Detain Immigrants Without Procedural Protections, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1477, 1514–16 (2011). Though Fiallo v. Bell rejected an equal protection attack on an 
immigration statute, the Court left the door open for judicial review. 430 U.S. at 792, 793 n.5 
(“Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even 
with respect to the power of the Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of 
aliens . . . .”). Lower courts have taken this language, combined with the “facially legitimate and 
bona fide reason” test from Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), to support judicial 
review in immigration. Following these lower court decisions it appears the plenary power is 
diminishing. See Motomura, supra note 215, at 607–13. 
 219. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001). While the case was decided on statutory 
grounds, the constitutional values may have influenced the decision. 
 220. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132 (1976). 
 221. See supra note 166. 
 222. The Court first indicated a willingness to extend heightened scrutiny to an equal 
protection challenge in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). While no opinion received a 
majority vote, the opinions of five different justices indicated a willingness to extend intermediate 
scrutiny to equal protection claims in immigration matters. Pinix, supra note 4, at 481. Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence specifically stated that she would only be willing to apply intermediate 
scrutiny if the citizen father was in the case. Id. at 484. Then in Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60–
61 (2001), while it ultimately upheld the law, the Court did apply a heightened scrutiny to the 
gender discrimination claim. 
 223. 533 U.S. 53, 58 (2011). 
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one person who is either a U.S. citizen or LPR.224 Therefore, same-
sex binational couples have an even stronger claim for relief than the 
plaintiffs in Nguyen do. There, the citizen was tangentially involved 
with the noncitizen who suffered the direct injury. A same-sex 
binational couple like Beddingfield and de Leon could challenge the 
immigration law based on its direct injury to the citizen, 
Beddingfield, by preventing him from sponsoring his spouse while 
allowing other citizens to sponsor their spouses. 
Once the couple has standing to appeal, the only open question 
is what level of review the Court should apply. This would likely 
depend on any precedent set in a Gill or Perry appeal that leads to 
this post-DOMA world. It would seem unlikely that if the Court were 
to strike down DOMA on equal protection grounds it would not also 
strike down a use of the plenary power that similarly discriminates 
against same-sex couples. Thus, the plenary power is not an obstacle 
to same-sex binational couples seeking immigration benefits. In a 
post-DOMA world, the important step for same-sex binational 
couples would be getting their marriages recognized under the INA. 
The current three-step approach for marriage recognition under the 
INA should not pose a problem for same-sex binational couples. 
3.  Applying the INA Three-Step Test Allows for  
Recognition of Marriage for Same-Sex Couples 
Assuming that Congress does not create a universal definition of 
marriage, how would “marriage” or “spouse” be defined in 
immigration laws in a post-DOMA world? Immigration law (like 
other federal laws) generally follows states’ (or another nation’s) 
definitions of marriage.225 The INA does not explicitly provide this in 
its text, but a valid marriage for purposes of the INA currently 
follows a three-step approach: (1) validity where celebrated, subject 
to (2) policy exceptions, and (3) bona fides.226 
First, the general rule is that “a marriage valid where celebrated 
is valid everywhere.”227 Courts have long enforced this principle in 
 
 224. See generally Motomura, supra note 9 (discussing so-called citizen proxy arguments). 
 225. See infra notes 229–32 and accompanying text. 
 226. Titshaw, supra note 45, at 550. 
 227. Id. at 559; see also 2 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 25, § 36.02[2][a], 
at 36–4 to –8 (“The validity of a marriage ordinarily is judged by the law of the place where it is 
celebrated.”). 
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regard to conflict of laws and immigration.228 For family-based 
immigration, married couples must demonstrate to immigration 
officials through documentation that they followed the law in the 
jurisdiction where they celebrated their marriage.229 This is true 
whether the jurisdiction is a U.S. state or another country.230 This 
deference to states extends to so-called common-law marriage231 and 
even to a marriage involving a transsexual232 person. The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled that a transsexual woman233 is able 
to sponsor a foreign-born man because North Carolina gives legal 
effect to sex reassignment and recognizes the marriage as 
heterosexual; thus, the marriage does not violate DOMA.234 While it 
is arguable whether Congress intended to allow such marriages under 
DOMA, the BIA will determine marital status per individual state 
law unless it is a so-called same-sex marriage—falling explicitly 
under the narrow exception in DOMA Section 3, the definitional 
provision.235 Following this general rule of deference to state law, in 
the absence of DOMA the INA should recognize the marriages of 
same-sex couples that were performed in states or countries where 
the marriages are valid, like Massachusetts or the Netherlands. 
The second part of the test could—but likely does not—pose a 
problem for binational same-sex couples. There is a public policy 
 
 228. See, e.g., Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. 550, 587 (1848) (“Marriage is to be decided by the 
laws of the place where celebrated.” (citing Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts 158, 168 (1840))); Luna, 
18 I. & N. Dec. 385, 386 (B.I.A. 1983) (“The District Director correctly noted that the validity of 
a marriage generally is determined according to the law of the place of celebration.”). 
 229. See, e.g., FAM: VISAS 40.1, supra note 43, at note N1.1(c) (“The underlying principle in 
determining the validity of the marriage is that the law of the place of marriage celebration 
controls (except as noted in paragraph d of this section). If the law is complied with and the 
marriage is recognized, then the marriage is deemed to be valid for immigration purposes.”). 
Paragraph (d) is discussed infra note 238 and accompanying text. 
 230. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, § A, at 327. 
 231. Titshaw, supra note 45, at 562. 
 232. The word “transsexual” is chosen over the broader term “transgender” because 
transsexual more narrowly refers to people who choose medical treatment to align their gender 
identities with their physical bodies. Mary Coombs, Sexual Dis-orientation: Transgendered 
People and Same-Sex Marriage, 8 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 219, 238 (1998). 
 233. This refers to a person born with XY chromosomes that had surgery to reassign her body 
as a female. 
 234. Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 751 (B.I.A. 2005). 
 235. Id. at 751–52 (“If Hawaii or some other State eventually recognizes homosexual 
‘marriage,’ Section 3 will mean simply that that ‘marriage’ will not be recognized as a ‘marriage’ 
for purposes of federal law. Other than this narrow federal requirement, the federal government 
will continue to determine marital status in the same manner it does under current law.” (citing 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 31 (1996))). 
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exception to the general rule of validity where celebrated. Strong 
public policy objections are often grounds for a state to refuse to 
recognize marriages that were celebrated in another state, but an 
even stronger policy is necessary in the context of immigration.236 
Per the Attorney General, only express public policy in immigration 
law can be used to deny admission to aliens.237 There is no express 
federal public policy against so-called same-sex marriages. It could 
be argued that DOMA (if it is still law) is such a public policy, but 
the U.S. State Department specifically distinguishes between public 
policy exceptions and DOMA when it explains which marriages 
should be void.238 Further, the Obama administration’s public policy 
extends benefits to same-sex couples to the extent possible under 
DOMA.239 So, if DOMA were no longer law, there is no public 
policy basis to refuse to respect the validity of marriages between 
same-sex couples if they were valid where they were celebrated. 
The final step of the analysis to determine whether a marriage is 
valid under the INA requires the marriage to be bona fide. Marriage 
fraud could also be labeled a federal public policy exception (rather 
than the final step in assessing the validity of marriage), but, 
regardless, it would not prevent INA recognition of marriages 
between same-sex individuals. The INA, in several instances, 
expressly lays out marriage bona fides as evidentiary requirements.240 
Immigration officials try to determine whether the couple entered 
into the marriage solely for the purpose of obtaining immigration 
benefits. The officials will often look at numerous documents like 
 
 236. For a discussion of state public policy exceptions and their affect on the INA, see infra 
Part V.B. 
 237. Issuance of Immigration Visa, 37 Op. Att’y. Gen. 102, 111 (1933) (“The only public 
policy of the United States that I am authorized to recognize with respect to the admissibility of 
aliens is that found in the immigration law.”). 
 238. FAM: VISAS 40.1, supra note 43, at note N1.1(d) (“Marriages, considered to be void 
under State law as contrary to public policy, such as polygamous or incestuous marriages, or 
which Federal law such as the Defense of Marriage Act determines does not meet the Federal 
definition of a marriage, cannot be recognized for immigration purposes even if the marriage is 
legal in the place of marriage celebration.”). 
 239. CNN Wire Staff, Obama Orders More Benefits for Same-Sex Partners of Federal 
Workers, CNN (June 2, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-02/us/obama.gay.benefits_1_ 
same-sex-partners-federal-workers-benefits?_s=PM:US. 
 240. This is a requirement for permanent residence, INA § 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(III), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(III) (2006); deportation for marriage fraud, INA § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(1)(G); and knowingly entering into a marriage to evade immigration laws, INA 
§ 275(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c). 
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wedding photos and love letters to find the possibility of a sham 
marriage.241 Marriages of same-sex couples should be able to meet 
the same scrutiny if the marriages were indeed not fraudulent.242 
4.  Precedent Restricting  
Recognition Is No Longer Valid 
The only possible legal obstacle for allowing marriages of same-
sex couples under the INA post-DOMA is the precedent of Adams v. 
Howerton, which says that Congress intended the term marriage in 
the INA to only include opposite-sex couples.243 Yet, this precedent, 
while it has not been overturned, is no longer valid. First, the Adams 
decision relied on Congress’ express exclusion of gays and lesbians 
under the INA.244 As of 1990, there is no longer an express exclusion 
in the statute, so it cannot be a justification to maintain the Adams’ 
precedent. Also, the Ninth Circuit no longer uses test that the Adams 
court applied to the INA.245 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit now 
expressly acknowledges that the INA relies on state law in 
determining whether a marriage exists,246 while the Adams court 
looked only to federal law. Even the DOJ has argued that the reasons 
for the denial of immigration benefits in Adams “are no longer valid 
today.”247  
Without Adams posing any significant precedential problem, in 
a post-DOMA world the INA should recognize same-sex binational 
couples’ valid marriages under the current three-step approach. 
Assuming that federal recognition of legal marriages between same-
sex couples occurs, the only remaining obstacle for same-sex 
immigration equality is state marriage recognition. Without criminal 
prohibitions, state public policy will not likely stand in the way of 
INA recognition of marriages between same-sex individuals. 
 
 241. Titshaw, supra note 45, at 581, 581 n.195. 
 242. In fact, the UAFA is specifically written to provide equal fraud standards for permanent 
partnerships as marriages. See infra text accompanying notes 274–75. 
 243. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 244. Id. at 1040. 
 245. Adams used a two-part test, but a three-part test is the current black letter rule. Ageyman 
v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 879 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 246. Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 247. Geidner, supra note 210. 
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B.  State Marriage Recognition Post-DOMA 
Before same-sex binational couples are eligible for family-based 
immigration, they must first be married in a jurisdiction that is 
willing to perform marriages for same-sex couples. As of 
publication, there are only seven jurisdictions where same-sex 
marriage is legal in the United States.248 The INA’s “valid where 
celebrated” requirement recognizes international marriages, so the 
options for gays and lesbians also include one of the ten nations that 
currently allow marriages for same-sex couples.249 Unless a couple 
lives in one of these sixteen places, it appears that they cannot enter 
into a valid marriage. A seemingly easy solution, though, is for them 
to get married in a neighboring jurisdiction that allows marriage for 
individuals of the same sex, even if the couple’s state of domicile 
does not. 
Besides the inconvenience and expense of travel, same-sex 
binational couples must be aware that state public policy exceptions 
may prevent marriage recognition under the INA.250 Though most 
states recognize valid marriages from other states,251 the common law 
recognizes exceptions when there is a strong public policy objection 
to a marriage in the couple’s state of domicile.252 Many states have a 
public policy against so-called same-sex marriage.253 However, under 
 
 248. See supra note 77. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Titshaw, supra note 45, at 565. 
 251. This is in accordance with comity and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 252. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (1971) (“A marriage 
which satisfies the requirements of the state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere 
be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the 
most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.” 
(emphasis added)). Section 2 of DOMA codifies this exception specifically for so-called same-
sex marriages. See supra note 66. Since Gill and Mass. v. HHS do not challenge Section 2, it 
could pose an obstacle for same-sex couples seeking to have their marriages recognized in their 
states of domicile. However, assuming that Section 3 is struck down, it would seem unlikely that 
Section 2 could also stand, as it is likely a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See Mark 
Strasser, Life After DOMA, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 399, 408–12 (2010). Also, any 
precedent created in striking down Section 3 could be used to attack Section 2. For example, if 
Section 3 is struck down because it was passed with animus, Section 2 could similarly be 
attacked. If no violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause exists, then states are already free to 
refuse recognition of marriages between same-sex individuals that were performed in other states, 
so Section 2 is superfluous. 
 253. Thirty states have constitutional amendments prohibiting so-called same-sex marriage 
and thirty-nine have statutes to a similar effect. Same Sex Marriage, supra note 77. There are also 
several states without a public policy against marriages of same-sex couples. Besides the seven 
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the INA the policy must be a criminal prohibition before recognition 
is refused.254 After Lawrence—where a statute criminalizing same-
sex sodomy was ruled unconstitutional—it seems unlikely that states 
could criminalize so-called same-sex marriage.255 Thus, marriages of 
same-sex couples will likely be recognized under the INA, even if 
the couples are not domiciled in one of the seven jurisdictions that 
perform such marriages.256 
The only other possible public policy that could impede INA 
recognition of marriages between same-sex individuals is the 
prohibition on the evasion of marriage laws. The BIA has previously 
refused to recognize a marriage that violates the law of a couple’s 
state of domicile—when the state expressly prohibited couples from 
evading marriage laws by traveling for the purpose of marrying and 
then returning.257 Therefore, same-sex couples who are domiciled in a 
state that expressly prohibits the evasion of its marriage laws may 
not be able to travel, get married, and, on their return, expect federal 
recognition of their marriage. Yet, this rule rests on a single BIA case 
that involved criminal prohibition.258 Same-sex binational couples 
will need to research local laws in order to know if their state of 
domicile has a criminal law prohibiting the evasion of its marriage 
laws. Post-DOMA, it is plausible that state governments may pass 
 
jurisdictions that allow such marriages, several states recognize marriages of same-sex couples 
performed elsewhere. Maryland, and Rhode Island recognize marriages of same-sex couples 
performed elsewhere. Id. New Mexico and New Jersey neither recognize nor prohibit marriage 
between individuals of the same-sex. See id. However, the Attorney General of New Mexico 
released an opinion on January 4, 2010, stating that marriages of same-sex couples performed 
elsewhere can be recognized under New Mexico law. Steve Terrell, AG: Other States’ Same-Sex 
Marriages Valid in N.M., SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Jan. 5, 2011), 
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/Local%20News/AG--Other-states--same-sex-marriages-
valid-in-N-M-. Washington approved a measure recognizing out-of-state same-sex marriages as 
domestic partnerships. Associated Press, WA Legislature OKs Out-of-State Same-sex Unions, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 30, 2011 1:56 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/ 
2014641392_apwaxgrdomesticpartnerships1stldwritethru.html. 
 254. Titshaw, supra note 45, at 569 (“Generally, so long as the couple’s relationship would 
not violate the strong public policy expressed in the criminal law of its state of domicile, the 
marriage is valid for U.S. immigration purposes.” (emphasis added)). This principle has been 
applied to states with antimiscegenation, consanguinity, and age-of-consent laws. Id. at 565–75. 
 255. See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 256. This does not mean that the state would have to recognize the marriage under its laws. 
See Strasser, supra note 252, at 418. 
 257. Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. 439, 442 (B.I.A. 1967) (denying recognition of a legal marriage 
performed in South Carolina between first cousins because they violated Wisconsin’s statutory 
provisions criminalizing first-cousin marriages and the evasion of its marriage laws). 
 258. Id. 
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such laws to make sure that their public policy against so-called 
same-sex marriage is not circumvented. This may require some 
couples to move in order to receive immigration rights. 
Assuming that there is no criminal prohibition of marriage 
between individuals of the same-sex or of the evasion of marriage 
laws, states will not have a strong enough public policy exception to 
change the “valid where celebrated” rule for purposes of the INA. 
Thus, legally married same-sex binational couples would likely be 
eligible for spousal sponsorship under the INA regardless of where 
they are domiciled. Of course, all of this is only possible in a post-
DOMA world. If DOMA remains law, same-sex binational couples 
will continue to be denied family-unification unless some legislative 
action is taken. 
VI.  UAFA AND ITS  
IMPLICATIONS FOR IMMIGRATION 
If DOMA is not repealed or overturned, same-sex binational 
couples must look elsewhere to achieve immigration equality. One 
solution is the Uniting American Families Act (UAFA), which adds 
a new category of “permanent partner” to family-based 
immigration.259 The UAFA has been introduced in Congress as a 
stand-alone bill, but it is also being discussed as a necessary piece of 
any comprehensive immigration reform.260 Even if the UAFA is 
passed in some form, same-sex binational couples will not be treated 
as equal to opposite-sex couples under the current language of the 
bill. This part explores UAFA’s drafting pitfalls and possible 
resolutions. 
A.  History of the Bill 
In February 2000, Representative Jerrold Nadler of New York 
first introduced the Permanent Partners Immigration Act in the 
House of Representatives.261 Three years later, Senator Patrick Leahy 
 
 259. Dennis A. Golden, The Policy Considerations Surrounding the United States 
Immigration Law as Applied to Bi-national Same-sex Couples: Making the Case for the Uniting 
American Families Act, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 319 (2009). 
 260. Rep. Mike Honda, Immigration Reform Makes Cents, POLITICO (Feb. 3, 2011 4:40 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0211/48697.html. 
 261. Permanent Partners Immigration Act of 2000, H.R. 3650, 106th Cong. (2000), available 
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:HR03650:. 
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of Vermont introduced a sister bill in the Senate.262 In 2005, both 
bills were renamed as the Uniting American Families Act.263 The 
UAFA’s purpose is to amend the INA to allow U.S. citizens and 
LPRs to sponsor their permanent partners.264 In other words, it 
purports to provide same-sex binational couples with the same 
spousal sponsorship rights that opposite-sex married couples receive 
without requiring the same-sex couples to be married. Providing 
these rights, however, will require passage of the bill, which is far 
from likely in the 112th Congress.265 
While the UAFA may not pass as a stand-alone bill, it is also 
included in more comprehensive reforms of family-based 
immigration. Representative Mike Honda of California introduced 
the Reuniting Families Act on August 19, 2009.266 The bill is meant 
to generally promote family unity in immigration by alleviating the 
long wait times for families of LPRs (by making them exempt from 
quotas) and decreasing other measures that prevent family members 
from obtaining visas.267 Further, by incorporating the UAFA, the bill 
“eliminates discrimination in immigration law” against same-sex 
couples.268 As part of comprehensive immigration reform, the bill has 
a broader coalition of immigrant and civil rights groups supporting it 
than the UAFA alone has.269 The largest problem for same-sex 
binational couples is that the Reuniting Families Act’s sister bill in 
 
 262. Permanent Partners Immigration Act of 2003, S. 1510, 108th Cong. (2003), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:S01510:. 
 263. Golden, supra note 259, at 319. 
 264. Id. 
 265. All cosponsors of the UAFA proposed in 2009 were Democrats. See H.R. 1024 
Cosponsors, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR01024:@ 
@@P (last visited Nov. 5, 2010); S. 424 Cosponsors, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN00424:@@@P (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). The 
House of the 112th Congress is controlled by a Republican majority, making it unlikely that a bill 
sponsored only by Democrats will pass. Alan Silverleib, supra note 91. The Senate in 2009 held 
its first hearing on the UAFA, but only four senators attended, which demonstrates the weak 
support for passage. Matt Graham, UAFA Senate Hearing, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES 
(June 4, 2009), http://www.cis.org/Graham/UAFAHearing. 
 266. Reuniting Families Act of 2009, H.R. 2709, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.2709:. 
 267. Reuniting Families Act, supra note 38. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Kerry Eleveld, Reuniting Families Act Introduced, ADVOCATE (June 4, 2009), 
http://www.advocate.com/article.aspx?id=78468. Rep. Honda also thinks that the bill can appeal 
to his Republican colleagues because of the fiscal impact of broader reform. Honda, supra note 
260. 
 
1386 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1339 
the Senate does not include the UAFA language.270 So, same-sex 
binational couples may be left out of comprehensive immigration 
reform. 
While the political prospects of the UAFA and the Reuniting 
Families Act remain uncertain, as long as DOMA remains law, these 
bills provide the only hope for same-sex families wishing to remain 
together in the United States. The rest of this part analyzes the bill’s 
goals for equal family unification (assuming it is passed in its current 
version) and the requirements that make it fall short of those aims. 
B.  Text of the UAFA 
If the UAFA (or the House version of the Reuniting Families 
Act) becomes law, it would allow gay and lesbian U.S. citizens and 
LPRs to sponsor their “permanent partner[s]” for green cards, in the 
same manner that opposite-sex spouses do. The bill amends the INA 
and defines a permanent partner as: 
[A]n individual 18 years of age or older who— 
(A) is in a committed, intimate relationship with another 
individual 18 years of age or older in which both parties 
intend a lifelong commitment; 
(B) is financially interdependent with that other individual; 
(C) is not married to or in a permanent partnership with 
anyone other than that other individual; 
(D) is unable to contract with that other individual a 
marriage cognizable under this Act; and 
(E) is not a first, second, or third degree blood relation of 
that other individual.271 
Once all of these requirements are met, a gay or lesbian’s permanent 
partner will be treated like a “spouse” under the INA.272 
Despite concerns,273 the UAFA would not be any more 
susceptible to fraud than current spousal sponsorship is. A same-sex 
couple will have to prove a bona fide relationship through documents 
 
 270. Reuniting Families Act, S. 1085, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
cgi-bin/query/z?c111:S.1085:. 
 271. Uniting American Families Act of 2009, H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
 272. The bill adds the words “permanent partner” after the term “spouse” throughout the INA. 
Id. 
 273. Opponents of the UAFA contend that the bill will open the door to immigration fraud. 
Graham, supra note 265. 
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with the same burden of proof that opposite-sex married couples 
have.274 The U.S. citizen or LPR who is sponsoring his or her partner 
will have to commit to financial support—just like opposite-sex 
couples have to do.275 Even the same criminal penalties apply for 
immigration fraud and abuse.276 On its face, the law purports to 
provide gays and lesbians with an equal opportunity to sponsor their 
loved ones for family-based immigration. However, there are 
obstacles within the bill for same-sex binational couples—namely, 
meeting the bill’s requirements and their interaction with DOMA. 
C.  Marriage Cognizable Under the Act:  
Interpreting for Consistency 
The UAFA tries to avoid a conflict with DOMA by limiting its 
application to couples “unable to contract . . . a marriage cognizable 
under [the INA].”277 Same-sex couples are the intended beneficiaries 
of this new category since their marriages are currently not 
cognizable under the INA—because of DOMA. When the UAFA 
was originally proposed in 2000, no state performed marriage 
between same-sex individuals. Now there are seven jurisdictions 
doing so, and there are also several court challenges to DOMA. Both 
of these new developments create asymmetrical rights and make the 
“unable to contract . . . a marriage cognizable under [the INA]” 
requirement complex to apply. 
1.  Asymmetrical Rights Are Created 
If a couple like de Leon and Beddingfield is legally married in 
Washington, D.C., can the spouses still apply for permanent partner 
sponsorship? They are married, but because of DOMA their marriage 
is not cognizable under federal law. It seems that they fit the 
UAFA’s criteria. This interpretation would allow the bill to apply in 
today’s world to married same-sex couples, but it would create 
inequality for opposite-sex couples. Permanent partnerships only 
apply to couples that cannot get married under federal law. Opposite-
sex couples are able to get married and are thus unable to form 
 
 274. Ayoub & Wong, supra note 50, at 573. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. See supra text accompanying note 271. 
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permanent partnerships under the INA. In jurisdictions that recognize 
marriages between same-sex individuals, members of same-sex 
binational couples, whether they are married or not, would be able to 
sponsor their partners or spouses, but opposite-sex couples would 
only be given the same benefit if they choose to marry. This would 
treat couples differently based on gender and could be a Fifth 
Amendment equal protection issue.278 
Another asymmetrical rights structure would exist if DOMA 
were only partially struck down. For example, DOMA could be 
struck down only in the First Circuit for a period of time,279 while the 
Congress could pass the UAFA to benefit people in other circuits. 
Under this scenario, marriages of same-sex couples in Massachusetts 
and New Hampshire would be recognized in their state and under 
federal law, so those couples could not apply for permanent 
partnerships. However, marriages of same-sex couples in Vermont 
and Washington, D.C., would not be recognized federally, so those 
couples could apply for permanent partnerships. This would create 
an incoherent patchwork where members of same-sex binational 
couples in Vermont, whether they are married or not, could sponsor 
their partners or spouses, but similar couples in Massachusetts would 
only be given the same benefit if they choose to marry. The federal 
government would then be treating couples differently based on 
where they live—another potential equal protection issue.280 
If DOMA were repealed or struck down nationwide, an 
asymmetrical rights issue would not exist, but the UAFA would be 
superfluous.281 This means that Congress would not likely pass the 
UAFA in a post-DOMA world. It is possible, however, that the 
UAFA could pass and that DOMA could then be repealed or 
overturned sometime later.282 This would implicate the interpretation 
 
 278. However, the government could argue that there is an important interest for the gender 
disparity—remedying past discrimination. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (finding 
that reduction in past disparity because of gender is an important governmental objective). The 
ultimate outcome of such a case is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 279. This assumes that the First Circuit affirms Gill or Mass. v. HHS and the Supreme Court 
denies certiorari. 
 280. Since no suspect classification or fundamental right is at stake, the Court would likely 
only apply rational basis review. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 74, at 719–23. 
 281. In a post-DOMA world, same-sex married couples would likely have equal family-based 
immigration rights. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 282. If the UAFA were law and DOMA was repealed later, there would be administrative 
issues to consider. Some same-sex binational couples may have already applied for permanent 
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problem—what does it mean to be unable to contract a cognizable 
marriage? 
2.  When Is a Couple Unable to Contract Marriage? 
If DOMA is repealed after the UAFA is in place, marriages 
between same-sex individuals would become cognizable under the 
INA. Couples that can marry are not able to be permanent partners. 
Does this mean that same-sex couples in states that prohibit so-called 
same-sex marriage, like Texas,283 are “unable to contract . . . a 
marriage cognizable under [the INA]”? Without DOMA, same-sex 
couples in states like Texas may still be able to get married in 
Massachusetts and then have their marriage recognized under the 
INA.284 On the other hand, if the state criminally prohibits the 
evasion of its marriage laws, the couple may not be able to contract a 
marriage. 
The law would be unclear on what obstacles make the couple 
unable to contract a marriage. Would it be sufficient that the couple 
has to travel out of state or would they need to be subject to some 
criminal prohibition? Some guidance from Congress or an 
interpretation of the UAFA by the BIA would be necessary. A 
narrow interpretation of the UAFA could lead to different treatment 
federally depending on where one lives, but deference to state law 
may be a rational basis for such distinction. Assuming the broadest 
interpretation, Texas couples would likely be considered unable to 
contract a marriage. Then same-sex binational couples in Texas (and 
in other states where so-called same-sex marriage is not allowed) 
could apply for family-based immigration as permanent partners. 
3.  Remove the Requirement in Order to Broaden the Bill 
To avoid these interpretation problems and possible 
asymmetrical rights issues, the best fix is to eliminate the UAFA’s 
 
partnership, but now they could in theory apply for a green card as a spouse. Since there are 
different requirements for permanent partners and spouses, some administrative measure would 
be necessary to change the application. One solution could be some form of “upgrade” to the 
sponsorship petitions. See Glossary of Visa Terms: Upgrade a Petition, TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/glossary/glossary_1363.html#upgradepetition (last visited Apr. 9, 
2011). 
 283. See Same Sex Marriage, supra note 77. 
 284. This of course depends on the state’s public policy and potential criminal prohibitions in 
regard to marriage. See discussion supra Part V.B. 
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restrictive language altogether. This would take care of the problem 
of interpreting who is “unable to contract” in today’s world, where 
marriages between same-sex individuals are performed, and what is 
“cognizable” in a post-DOMA world. 
Yet the benefits go beyond that. Striking out the language would 
mean that even opposite-sex couples could apply for permanent 
partnerships. This serves two purposes. First, this may increase 
support behind the UAFA by making it no longer about same-sex 
couples but more generally about family unification. Second, this 
would recognize the changing family structure in the United States. 
For example, as of the 2000 census, unmarried cohabitating partners 
formed nearly four million households.285 Expanding permanent 
partnerships to some of these couples (that may be binational) would 
also bring U.S. family unification policy closer to those of our 
international allies.286 In all, eliminating the unable-to-contract-a-
marriage requirement would provide a more consistent application of 
the rights granted by the bill—whether or not DOMA is law. 
D.  Financial Interdependence: Problems and Solutions 
Separate from the unable-to-contract-a-marriage requirement 
discussed above, the UAFA’s financial-interdependence requirement 
for a permanent partnership is particularly problematic for same-sex 
binational couples. The requirement that a permanent partner be 
“financially interdependent with that other individual”287 seems to be 
modeled after state domestic partnership laws. But binational 
 
 285. There are 3.8 million, but that number is likely undercounted. JASON FIELDS & LYNNE 
M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 
MARCH 2000, at 12 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-537.pdf. For 
a further discussion on responding to the growth of nonmarital cohabitation see Thomas P. 
Gallanis, The Flexible Family in Three Dimensions, 28 LAW & INEQ. 291 (2010). 
 286. See generally Bonnie Miluso, Note, Family “De-unification” in the United States: 
International Law Encourages Immigration Reform for Same-Gender Binational Partners, 36 
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 915 (2004) (providing examples of nations that have incorporated 
same-gender partner immigration rights into their legal structures). For example, Canada provides 
three avenues for a citizen to sponsor a partner (whether same-sex or opposite-sex): as a spouse, 
as a common-law partner, or as a conjugal partner. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION CAN., 
IMMIGRATION CANADA: SPONSORSHIP OF A SPOUSE, COMMON-LAW PARTNER, CONJUGAL 
PARTNER OR DEPENDENT CHILD LIVING OUTSIDE CANADA 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/kits/guides/3999E.pdf. The United Kingdom does not recognize 
marriages of same-sex couples, but it has allowed immigration for same-sex couples through the 
“Unmarried Partners Rule.” Miluso, supra, at 931. 
 287. See supra text accompanying note 271. 
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relationships—often requiring the partners to live oceans apart— are 
inherently different from domestic relationships, where both persons 
are U.S. citizens. Also, no such financial-interdependence 
requirement is imposed on opposite-sex couples, so it is not clear 
what the requirement entails and how binational couples are able to 
satisfy it. Removing this requirement or expanding fiancé visas are 
possible solutions to assure that the UAFA’s goals are achievable for 
all same-sex binational couples. 
1.  Defining Financial Interdependence 
The UAFA never defines what it means to be financially 
interdependent with the other individual,288 and the requirement is 
neither mentioned nor defined in the INA itself.289 If the plain 
meaning rule were followed,290 financial interdependence would be 
interpreted to roughly mean reliance between two people for 
financial support.291 This reliance could be proved “by submitting 
evidence of a joint bank account, and shared responsibility (e.g. both 
names on statements) for credit cards, utilities, rent, and the like.”292 
Many domestic laws and policies support this explanation. Some 
states have similar financial interdependence language within their 
domestic partnership laws,293 and businesses often require a 
comparable showing of financial interdependence for a gay or 
lesbian employee’s same-sex partner to receive company benefits.294 
Thus, the remainder of this part assumes that the UAFA drafters 
 
 288. See H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 289. A Westlaw search of 8 U.S.C. for “finan! interdep!” and “financially interdependent” 
obtained zero results. President Obama even acknowledges that the language is vague and needs 
to be more specific. Timothy R. Carraher, Note, Some Suggestions for the UAFA: A Bill for 
Same-Sex Binational Couples, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 150, 164 (2009). 
 290. The plain meaning rule states that courts should interpret statutory language, if possible, 
under its plain meaning. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“It is 
elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in 
which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of 
the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to 
its terms.”). 
 291. This definition was formed by combining the definitions of “inter” and “dependence.” 
See MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY 334 (11th ed. 2008). 
 292. Uniting American Families Act, NAT’L CENTER FOR LESBIAN RTS., n.2 
http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?pagename=issue_federallegislation_uafa#footnote2 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2010). 
 293. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-12-1(3) (2010). 
 294. Raymond C. O’Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 163, 181 (1995). 
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intend to require a showing of financial support through factors like 
bank accounts and rent. 
2.  Achieving Interdependence  
Is Inherently Difficult for Binational Couples 
The problem with such a definition of the financial-
interdependence requirement is that what may work for domestic law 
will not necessarily achieve similar results when it is applied on an 
international level. Given the current state of the law, many members 
of binational couples—like Sandra and her Hungarian partner—are 
forced to live apart.295 When they are not living together, it is difficult 
(if not impossible) for them to have shared responsibilities for rent 
and utilities. The option may exist for them to open an international 
bank account, but it is not clear if that would be sufficient to show 
that they rely on each other for support. If members of same-sex 
binational couples are unable to obtain financial interdependence, 
they cannot be united under the UAFA, as the requirement is a 
prerequisite to a permanent partnership. 
It seems that the UAFA drafters may have thought they fixed 
this by extending “conditional permanent resident status” to 
permanent partners.296 However, this provision falls short. It is really 
about proving the bona fides of a marriage (or permanent 
partnership).297 It will not assist members of same-sex binational 
couples in achieving financial interdependence because conditional 
status is granted only after a permanent partnership is formed. It 
seems unlikely that members of binational couples (who are likely 
living apart) who have been together less than two years would 
already be financially interdependent, so obtaining a permanent 
partnership would be difficult (if not impossible). 
If the couple is together in the United States, problems with 
financial interdependence still arise. The problem is so-called 
immigrant intent. All non-immigrant visas require the alien to not 
 
 295. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
 296. Under the INA currently, if an alien has been married to an opposite-sex spouse for less 
than two years, he or she is given a green card on a conditional basis. INA § 216, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1186a (2006). At the end of the two years, if the couple is still married, the alien is granted 
lawful permanent residence after another immigration interview. Id. This same conditional status 
under the UAFA is given to permanent partnerships under two years. H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. 
§ 12 (2009). 
 297. See infra text accompanying notes 305–06. 
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intend to stay in the United States permanently,298 and the burden is 
on the alien to prove this.299 Opening a bank account with a U.S. 
citizen could be evidence of the alien’s intent to stay and thus could 
violate his or her current visa. It would be problematic (and even 
ironic) for a same-sex couple to try to meet the UAFA’s requirement 
and at the same time violate the INA. There is a potential solution of 
so-called dual intent,300 but that is only expressly recognized for 
certain nonimmigrant categories like temporary workers.301 Another 
process—adjustment of status302—could also be helpful, but that 
process is discretionary303 so preconceived intent may be enough to 
deny adjustment. In all, members of same-sex binational couples, 
whether they live apart or together, are going to have many 
difficulties proving so-called financial interdependence and, 
therefore, achieving a permanent partnership under the UAFA. 
3.  Added Requirement  
Creates Asymmetrical Rights 
Besides being difficult to achieve, the financial-interdependence 
requirement, like the unable-to-contract-a-marriage requirement, 
creates an asymmetrical rights structure between same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples. Here, the same-sex couples are the ones who 
must meet an additional requirement before they receive immigration 
benefits. Opposite-sex spouses are not required to show that they are 
financially interdependent with each other in order to qualify for 
 
 298. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, at 400. 
 299. Id.; INA § 214(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b). 
 300. If the alien has the intent from the beginning to remain permanently in the United States, 
he or she is not a bona fide nonimmigrant and likely violating his or her visa. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 
supra note 44, at 400. On the other hand, the BIA has found that a person’s desire to remain in 
the United States, should an opportunity present itself legally, is not necessarily inconsistent with 
nonimmigrant status. Chryssikos v. Comm’r of Immigration, 3 F.2d 372, 375 (2d Cir. 1924); 
Hosseinpour, 15 I. & N. Dec. 191, 192 (B.I.A. 1975).  
 301. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, at 400. Dual intent is essentially recognized by 
the 1990 Immigration Act for most temporary workers (H, L, O and P visa categories). 2 
GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 25, § 12.03[1][c], at 12–19 to –20, § 20.06[3], 
at 20–21 to –23, § 20.13[8], at 20–153 to –154, § 25.01[3], at 25–6 to –8. 
 302. Under the INA, nonimmigrants who meet certain criteria are able to adjust their status to 
an LPR without having to travel overseas to obtain the green card from a consular office. INA 
§ 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 44, at 656–57. Adjustment of status 
can also provide relief from removal proceedings. INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The 
UAFA expressly adds “permanent partnership” after “marriage” and “spouse” in these provisions 
of the INA. H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. § 16–17 (2009). 
 303. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). 
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sponsorship.304 On the other hand, commingling of finances is often a 
primary way of proving the bona fides of a marriage.305 The 
commingling presumably happens after the marriage, and courts use 
it to look at the couple’s intent at time of marrying.306 In other words, 
same-sex couples would be required to show commingling of 
finances in order to obtain family-based immigration, but opposite-
sex couples would only need to demonstrate the same if the validity 
of the marriage were in question. To remove this inequality some fix 
is necessary. 
4.  Solution: Extending Fiancé Visas 
Opposite-sex couples have the option of obtaining fiancé visas. 
This could be the solution to provide equality between spouses and 
permanent partners and also give same-sex couples time to achieve 
financial interdependence. Though the INA only extends green cards 
to spouses (permanent or conditional), it does allow a fiancé of a 
U.S. citizen to enter the United States on a K-1 visa, as a 
nonimmigrant, in order to enter into a marriage.307 
The UAFA would not add permanent partnerships to K-1 visas, 
but only to K-2 visas.308 Therefore, under the UAFA, a gay or lesbian 
alien can enter the United States after his or her permanent 
partnership has been created with a U.S. citizen—meaning after 
financial interdependence is proved. If the UAFA were to add 
permanent partners to the K-1 visa, members of gay and lesbian 
couples who are living apart could come together in the United 
States for ninety days. In those ninety days, the couple would then be 
able to take the necessary steps to prove financial interdependence.309 
 
 304. See Immigrant Visas for Spouses of a U.S. Citizen (IR1 or CR1), TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, 
http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/types/types_2991.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 305. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
1625, 1685 (2007). 
 306. Id. 
 307. See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 308. H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (“Section 101(a) (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)) is amended—
(1) in paragraph (15)(K)(ii), by inserting ‘or permanent partnership’ after ‘marriage’ . . . .”). The 
K-2 visa only allows a spouse (or permanent partner under the UAFA) to enter the United States 
after the marriage is performed, while awaiting approval of the petition for sponsorship. INA 
§ 101(a)(15)(K)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(K)(ii). 
 309. They could open bank accounts, sign joint lease agreements, add the alien to utility bills, 
etc. 
  
Summer 2011] TRENDLINES 1395 
The likely opposition to this proposal is a claim of fraud, but 
there is no evidence that same-sex couples would be more fraudulent 
than opposite-sex couples are. In fact, if this change were to be made 
in the UAFA, then same-sex couples would be subject to the same 
deportation proceedings that opposite-sex couples face if they do not 
take the necessary steps within the ninety-day period.310 Without the 
addition of a K-1 visa for members of same-sex binational couples 
living apart, it is unclear how they could ever prove financial 
interdependence, and therefore achieve a permanent partnership. 
5.  Solution: Remove the Requirement 
A more direct solution to the problems of satisfying the 
financial-interdependence requirement and the asymmetrical system 
that it encourages would be to remove the requirement altogether. 
Many may object, but the language is superfluous to achieving the 
bill’s goals. One concern with the current INA sponsorship scheme is 
preventing the admission of aliens who are likely to become a 
“public charge.”311 The UAFA already addresses this concern 
(mirroring all other family sponsorship avenues) by requiring the 
sponsoring partner to complete an affidavit of support.312 The other 
goal of the financial-interdependence requirement could be that it 
constitutes proof of a committed relationship, the same way that it is 
used in domestic laws.313 A marriage license acts as proof for 
opposite-sex couples, so this requirement may be the proof for same-
sex couples. Of course, there are multiple jurisdictions that now give 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples, so that reasoning cannot work 
in those places.314 Regardless, the UAFA, even without this 
requirement, already requires a committed relationship explicitly, or 
it could easily be modified in other ways to do so. Per the UAFA, 
only conditional residence is granted for a partnership of less than 
 
 310. The UAFA would need to add permanent partners to INA § 214(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1184(d)(1) (“In the event the marriage . . . does not occur within three months after the 
admission . . . , [the alien] shall be required to depart from the United States and upon failure to 
do so shall be removed . . . .”). 
 311. INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4). 
 312. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(4)(C)(ii), 1183a(f)(1). 
 313. See supra notes 293–94. 
 314. The requirement may have been applicable when the UAFA was proposed in 2000, but 
now it seems to be a remnant of the past. 
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two years.315 If the partnership has lasted more than two years, 
instead of looking only at financial interdependence, immigration 
officials could look to the same bona fides that they consider for 
opposite-sex marriages.316 The goals of the financial interdependence 
prerequisite therefore are already met, or could be met, without 
adding a substantial obstacle for same-sex binational couples to 
overcome. 
The approach for determining the existence of a permanent 
partnership under the UAFA should be an overall assessment of the 
relationship, with financial interdependence being one factor but not 
a requirement. If it remains a requirement, many of the people who 
the UAFA is trying to help may be ineligible for family-based 
sponsorship. In other words, the UAFA—in its current form—might 
not be as equal as it purports to be. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As Representative Jerrold Nadler said, “We . . . strengthen our 
communities—and our nation—by encouraging loving couples and 
families to stay together . . . .”317 However, more than thirty-six 
thousand families—like Tan’s and de Leon’s—are unable to remain 
together legally in the United States simply because they are gay or 
lesbian. This is because of DOMA. A solution is necessary to 
prevent these families from choosing among separation, exile, or 
breaking the law. 
The UAFA extends family-based immigration to gays and 
lesbians, while avoiding the DOMA marriage restriction. But its 
requirements are unequal and difficult (if not impossible, given the 
current law) for binational couples to achieve. Equality in name and 
function is only possible with the end of DOMA. A legislative repeal 
is not immediately likely, so same-sex couples must turn to the 
federal courts for relief. Gill and Mass. v. HHS lay the groundwork 
for same-sex binational couples to challenge DOMA’s application to 
 
 315. See supra note 296. 
 316. See supra text accompanying note 241. Another option to prove commitment could be to 
look at cohabitation, but, then again, that is a problem for couples who are forced to live apart 
because of the current law. 
 317. Press Release, Representative Jerrold Nadler, Rep. Nadler Continues the Fight for LGBT 
Immigrant Rights (Feb. 12, 2009), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ny08_nadler/UAFA_ 
021209.html. 
  
Summer 2011] TRENDLINES 1397 
immigration. With the DOJ’s new stance on the unconstitutionality 
of DOMA, a successful challenge is more likely than ever before. 
The Perry litigation also provides many legal avenues for same-sex 
couples to build a successful DOMA challenge, especially if 
marriage is declared a fundamental right for all couples regardless of 
their gender (or sexual orientation). If DOMA were no longer law, 
same-sex binational couples would be steps away from immigration 
equality. There may be obstacles, but this Article illuminates a path 
to immigration equality in a post-DOMA world. 
While it is uncertain when DOMA will end or if comprehensive 
immigration reform will include same-sex binational families, it is 
clear that families and family law in the United States are changing 
rapidly. As President Obama acknowledged, it is “clear where the 
trendlines are going.”318 If the United States adheres to its policy of 
making family unification a cornerstone of immigration, soon the 
“arc of history”319 may include same-sex binational families. 
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